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Abstract of the Dissertation
Economic incentives of the WTO dispute settlement system with an empirical
focus on the agro-food sector
Christian Götz
The thesis contributes to the understanding of the drivers in countries’ decision to
adjudicate trade issues under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The DSM is a rules-based device for the
resolution of conflicts arising over the interpretation of trade law under the regime
of the organization. The DSM is self-enforcing, i.e. all actions of disputes are
driven by the parties to the dispute. This Member-driven nature of the DSM
implies that the conditions of its use are determined by market-related incentives,
Members’ resource endowments and constraints, and the characteristics of the
political economic relationship between potential complainants and defendants.
Negotiations on improvements of the DSM are going on since 1997
without yielding any resolution so far. The negotiations aim at making the DSM
more effective and to allow for equal accessibility of the system to all types of
Members. Reform proposals span a broad field; however, a targeted improvement
of the system requires a thorough understanding of economic incentives and
constraints faced by the potential users of the system.
Apart from an introduction, the thesis comprises two empirical and a
theoretical chapter. The empirical parts are focused on the agro-food sector to
provide a more in-depth analysis of sector-related characteristics. The starting
point is an aggregated analysis on capacity- and sector-related traits of initiating
Members and is based on a Binomial dispute distribution model adapted from the
literature. The second empirical chapter builds upon the analysis of the first but
shifts the focus to bilaterally dependent characteristics, which are of essential
relevance for the enforcement of compliance. The empirical intricacy implied by
the pure bilateral approach is solved by the application of the Weighted
Endogenous Sampling Maximum Likelihood (WESML) estimator.
Results show that Members’ tendency toward protectionist policies
decrease and the level of protectionism faced in their exports increase their
probability to initiate disputes. The first finding suggests a strategic behavior and
may also reflect Members’ general tendency towards market liberalization. The
second finding is in line with the system’s objectives. Also, Members’ operating
experience shows a positive effect on their number of filed disputes. This can be
rationalized by decreased fixed costs of litigation and by gained efficiency in the
processing of disputes through experience. In addition, the positive influence of
lobbying activity, their dependency on the defendant’s market for exports and the
value of agro-food imports from the defendant country could be supported.
The empirical investigations are complemented by a theory paper.
Drawing on the findings mentioned above and those from previous empirical
investigations on WTO dispute settlement, the chapter develops a comprehensive
economic modeling framework for the initiation of disputes. It thereby may serve
vas a tool for the evaluation of the system’s status quo and the assessment of
envisaged system changes.
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Zusammenfassung der Dissertation
Die ökonomischen Anreize des WTO Streitschlichtungsverfahrens mit
empirischem Schwerpunkt auf dem Agrar- und Lebensmittelsektor
Die Dissertation leistet einen Beitrag zum Verständnis der Einflussfaktoren in der
Entscheidung von Ländern, ihre Handelsauseinandersetzungen im Rahmen des
Streitschlichtungsmechanismus (SSM) der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) zu
verhandeln. Der SSM ist eine regelbasierte Institution für die Lösung von
Konflikten über die Interpretation des Handelsrechts unter dem Geltungsbereich
der Organisation. Es handelt sich dabei um ein selbstgesteuertes Verfahren, d.h.
dass alle damit verbundenen Aktivitäten von den Streitparteien getragen werden.
Diese mitgliedergetriebene Eigenschaft des SSM beinhaltet, dass seine
Nutzungsbedingungen bestimmt werden durch marktbezogene Anreize, durch die
Ressourcenausstattung der Mitglieder der Organisation und durch die
Beschaffenheit der politikökonomischen Beziehung zwischen potentiellen
Klägern und Beklagten.
Über eine Verbesserung des SSM wird seit 1997 verhandelt, ohne dass es
bislang zu einer Lösung gekommen wäre. Die Verhandlungen zielen darauf ab,
die Effektivität des SSM zu erhöhen und seine Nutzbarkeit allen Arten von
Mitgliedern zu ermöglichen. Die Reformvorschläge sind breit gefächert. Jedoch
erfordert eine gezielte Verbesserung des Systems ein tiefgründiges Verständnis
der ökonomischen Anreize und der Einschränkungen, denen potentielle Nutzer
des Systems gegenüberstehen.
Zusätzlich zu einer umfangreicheren Einleitung umfasst die Dissertation
zwei empirische und ein theoretisches Kapitel. Die empirischen Teile sind auf den
Agrar- und Lebensmittelsektor fokussiert, um eine eingehendere Untersuchung
der sektorbezogenen Eigenschaften bereitzustellen. Der Ausgangspunkt ist eine
aggregierte Analyse von kapazitäts- und sektorbezogenen Charakteristiken von
Klägern, und hat als Grundlage ein Binomiales Verteilungsmodell für Streitfälle,
welches aus der Literatur entnommen wurde. Das zweite empirische Kapitel baut
auf dieser ersten Analyse auf, verschiebt den Fokus jedoch hin zu bilateral
abhängigen Ländereigenschaften, welche von entscheidender Bedeutung für die
Durchsetzung der Regeleinhaltung sind. Die mit dem bilateralen Ansatz
verbundene empirische Komplexität wird durch die Anwendung des Weighted
Endogenous Sampling Maximum Likelihood (WESML)-Schätzers gelöst.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die protektionistische Tendenz von WTO-
Mitgliedern ihre Klagewahrscheinlichkeit verringert und der Umfang
protektionistischer Politiken, welchen sie in ihren Exportströmen ausgesetzt sind,
ihre Klagewahrscheinlichkeit erhöht. Ersteres mag ein strategisches Verhalten der
Länder oder auch ihre generelle Einstellung im Hinblick auf
Handelsliberalisierung widerspiegeln. Letzteres befindet sich in Übereinstimmung
mit den Zielen des Systems. Die Anwendungserfahrung mit dem System zeigt
ebenfalls einen positiven Einfluss auf die Anzahl von Klagen. Dies kann erklärt
werden mit abnehmenden Fixkosten und zunehmender Effizienz in der
Bearbeitung von Streitfällen durch die gewonnene Erfahrung. Zusätzlich zeigen
Lobbyaktivität, die Relevanz des beklagten Marktes für Exporte und der Wert
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von Agrar- und Lebensmittelimporten von diesem einen positiven Effekt auf die
Klagewahrscheinlichkeit von Ländern.
Die empirischen Analysen werden durch ein theoretisches Kapitel
ergänzt. Indem es sich auf die oben zitierten Ergebnisse sowie auf diejenigen
vorhergehender empirischer Untersuchungen zum WTO-Streitschlichtungssystem
stützt, entwickelt das Theoriekapitel ein umfassendes ökonomisches Modell für
die Initiierung von Streitfällen. Es mag daher als Mittel zur Evaluierung des status
quo des SSM, wie auch zur Bewertung der anvisierten Änderungen des Systems
dienen.
Keywords: World Trade Organization, WTO dispute, Agro-food sector, Binary
choice model, Testing hypotheses, Weighted Endogenous Sampling Maximum
Likelihood (WESML) estimator, Economic model
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1 Extended introduction
1.1 Motivation and research purpose
Established on 1 January 1995 by the Marrakesh Agreement
1
, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The WTO provides the institutional framework for trade between its
Members by administering and implementing the multilateral and plurilateral
trade agreements under its regime. Its major objectives are fostering the national
welfare of its Members through opening markets and promoting global
competition in international trade. Members’ deeper integration into world trade
is put into practice by the reciprocal exchange of liberalization commitments that
are negotiated among them primarily through periodic rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations. The rationale for the organization is that through this exchange,
governments are able to overcome political constraints in order to adopt more
efficient trade policies (HOEKMAN AND KOSTECKI 2001). The three main
agreements are the GATT, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). In addition, the Organization covers twelve multilateral and four
plurilateral
2
agreements.
3
It also acts as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations
and for resolving trade disputes, supervises national trade policies, and cooperates
with other international institutions involved in global economic policy-making.
The organization’s membership to date comprises 153 countries.
4
As an international organization the WTO does not provide for hierarchical
enforcement of its trade rules. Enforcement is decentralized to its Members by the
establishment of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). It is the central and
only enforcement mechanism of the multilateral trading system. Enforcement
under the DSM has far-reaching distributional effects, both for complainants’ and
1
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
2
In contrast to the multilateral agreements membership in the plurilateral agreements is not a pre-
condition of WTO-membership.
3
The most relevant agreements for agro-food trade are the Agreements on Agriculture, on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and on Technical Barriers to Trade.
4
Effective by 2011-09-30.
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defendants’ economies as well as for the whole membership (HOEKMAN AND
KOSTECKI 2001).
WTO complaints provide a stimulus for targeted states to bring their
policies into compliance with the rules of an agreement. A successfully litigated
complaint can produce benefits for a particular industry or sector in terms of
expanded market access both for the complainant as well as for other affected
Members. As the multilateral agreements are on Most-favored-nation (MFN)
basis, the benefits reaped from a dispute are bestowed de jure to all WTO
Members. This implies a public good characteristic of the system. Furthermore,
the DSM serves as a signaling device at the multilateral level indicating the
violator and the nature of the violation and thereby supplies information on
Members’ compliance with the system’s rules (SEVILLA 1997). The incentive for
governments to make concessions in WTO trade negotiations and to abide by
agreements is likely to depend on the effectiveness of enforcement by the DSM.
Effective enforcement provisions are particularly important for economically
weak countries, as they will rarely be able to exert credible threats against large
trading entities that do not abide by the negotiated rules. The realization of the
WTO’s benefits in terms of countries’ deeper integration into world trade and the
fostering of economic growth, is thereby critically dependent on the DSM’s
effectiveness and its accessibility to all different types of Members.
By this rules-based system for dispute settlement, i.e. ex ante principles
agreed upon for adjudicating trade issues, the WTO contributes to leveling the
playing field between economically stronger and weaker economies. However, if
some Members faced high barriers toward using the system, this would challenge
not only the utility of the DSM to them, but also the value of the multilateral
trading system in total.
Impaired access to the DSM entails several negative consequences. It could
lead to the notion that the system is unfair and decrease confidence in the system
both of governments as well as in the private sector. As a result, governments
might, first, be less prone to make concessions in successive trade negotiations
and, second, invest less in building up WTO-relevant institutional capacity. The
first point is an impediment to the WTO’s general objectives and functions. The
success of trade negotiations may not only depend on Members’ commitment
opportunities but also on their willingness to pursue them in general. Tendencies
of resentment with respect to the system are reflected in statements from political
Extended introduction
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bodies of developing countries (see SOUTH CENTRE 1999) as well as from diverse
NGOs politically acting in favor of them. The second point provides a further
handicap for active participation in the system, thereby preserving or even
intensifying the Member’s access problem. Less confidence on the private sector
level is likely to have similar effects. The private sector may not see the WTO as
a means to ensure settlement of its trade issues. Lower attentiveness to WTO-
related trade issues and fewer investments in structures to identify and
communicate them to their official representatives are a likely result.
Members who cannot effectively use the DSM may seek other means to
solve their trade grievances, which might result in more protectionism. This issue
of ‘vigilant justice’ as a backup position presents the plight that violations
particularly by smaller members remain unrevealed due to the trade-related
drivers of the system. Small markets and henceforth the involved trade stakes may
not justify cost adjudication of WTO infringements (GUZMAN AND SIMMONS
2005, SEVILLA 1997). As a consequence, the signaling and enforcement functions
of the DSM are not fully exploited. This applies both to trade infringements that
are not challenged because affected trade partners face barriers toward using the
system, as well as to the affected partner who may take recourse to protectionist
measures.
Furthermore, if unrevealed protectionism is a likely issue for small
economies, this suggests that WTO law is unevenly enforced, as argued by
SEVILLA (1997). If barriers to effectively use the DSM are related to resource
constraints, as identified by economists and groups of developing countries (see
e.g. ALAVI 2007, BESSON AND MEHDI 2004, DELICH 2002 and SOUTH CENTRE
1999), then, this questions the WTOs’ objectives with respect to the group of
developing country Members. The special needs and demands of developing and
least developed countries are in focus in the ongoing Doha round of trade
negotiations, semi-officially called the “Doha Development Agenda”. It was
officially launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar,
in November 2001. According to the Ministerial declaration, enhanced market
access and balanced rules are targeted “to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” (WTO
2011a).
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The system’s public good characteristic might not be sufficiently exploited if a
part of its Members abstains from participation in the system (HOEKMAN AND
KOSTECKI 2001, SEVILLA 1997). The incentives for free-ridership also may be
even higher in the face of access trouble. A further point is that the international
law applied in WTO agreements is formed by its interpretation through cases of
precedent. Prior adjudicated cases under the DSM originally are not intended to
serve as cases of precedent. However, both Members’ appraisal of former
outcomes in their decision to file or not, as well as the fact that panel decisions
may be guided by interpretations of prior cases, indicate that a broadly-based
usage might be more appropriate to ensure a balanced interpretation of WTO law
with respect to the trade interests of all types of Members (BOWN 2004a, 2005a).
The review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding was decided in a
Ministerial declaration on 1 January 1995 and negotiations started in 1997 ending
in 1999 without an agreement. The negotiations aiming at improvements and
clarifications of the procedure have been continued since 2002, however without
any resolution up to date and they still seem far from completion. There is a broad
spectrum of proposals from Members related to compliance issues, to developing
country interest, to timeframes and transparency issues and to other procedural
subjects like panel composition and third party rights in disputes. ZIMMERMANN
(2006) has classified them into either aiming at strengthening the system’s ‘rule
orientation’ or its ‘power orientation’, where the latter in contrast to the first
means that Members’ bargaining power in terms of economic size would play a
greater role in dispute resolution. Members’ proposals reflect their political
objectives and constraints.
However, a targeted improvement of the system requires an understanding
of the system’s drivers. This means that all efforts to increase the system’s
effectiveness have to be based on the understanding of Members’ incentives to
engage in the system as well as their constraints that are connected to that. The
thesis aims at the fundamental understanding of the DSM in order to facilitate the
reform discussion and to provide a basis for the system’s evaluation with respect
to its objectives.
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1.2 Problems and shortcomings of empirical studies on the
subject
Empirical investigation on the DSM started in 1999 with the analysis of HORN ET
AL. (1999) focusing on the question whether the use of the system is biased. Since
then a number of studies followed, focusing on different agreements and Member
characteristics (see e.g. REINHARDT 2000a and BOWN 2005b), Members’ role in a
dispute (complainant, co-complainant, interested third party, see BOWN 2005a),
on developing countries’ access to the DSM (see e.g. DAVIS AND BERMEO 2009,
DELICH 2002 and GUZMAN AND SIMMONS 2005), and their success in disputes
(BESSON AND MEHDI 2004). This was accompanied by case studies and
qualitative evaluations of the system (see e.g. ALAVI 2007, HUSSAIN 2005,
MICHALOPOULOS 1999 and 2001) and assessments on reform proposals both by
lawyers (see ZIMMERMANN 2006) and economists (BAGWELL ET AL. 2003 and
2006, and BAGWELL AND STAIGER 2006). Theoretical studies complemented the
research on the topic, either focusing on certain aspects of the DSM procedure
(see BOWN 2002 and 2004b) or on the economics of the multilateral trading
system in general (BAGWELL AND STAIGER 1999 and 2002).
Empirical investigations on the issue may involve several problems. They
are related to decisions on the setup of the analysis as well as to informational and
data measurement challenges. Regarding analyses on the determinants for dispute
initiation, there is the question of how disputes should be counted. Most studies
count the formal initiation under the WTO as a dispute.
5
5
The notification of a request for bilateral consultations to the WTO is the official start of a dispute.
One problem of this
approach is that it pools very different disputes together that vary with respect to
the stage they reach. About 45% of disputes do not reach the panel stage and a lot
of disputes remain pending without notification of settlement (BUSCH AND
REINHARDT 2002). As variables of interest might be related to certain stages of a
dispute this entails that the information contained is not fully exploited. Testing
hypotheses should ideally have information about all instances of disputes;
however the required data are presently not available (BUSCH AND REINHARDT
2002).
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A second problem of this compilation method is that it precludes Members’
controversies about trade policies raised in the form of comments in the General
Council and in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)
6
as well as in the
form of unilateral actions, e.g. by policy measures implemented under the U.S.
section 301 of USTR
7
If alternative ways to solve trade issues under the WTO had a considerable
share in the whole spectrum of trade issues, then estimations of determinants to
use the DSM would perhaps be biased. The conditions that lead to alternative
ways for arbitration cannot be considered in the investigation of the DSM’s use.
Apart from unilateral actions, the aforementioned alternative ways to address
trade issues can be assumed to play a minor role since they are lacking
enforcement power. One could argue that contested policy measures in the
General Council and the TPRM cause political pressure on the respective Member
having imposed them; however this is likely to be of minor relevance.
Nonetheless, according to the author’s information this issue to date has not been
taken into account in the literature on WTO disputes.
(BUSCH AND REINHARDT 2002). If the settlement of
disputes under the DSM is not independent of Members’ activity in those other
bodies or their unilateral opportunities to address trade issues under the WTO,
then concentrating on official disputes without accounting for those alternatives
may involve a sample selection bias. For instance, a trade issue might have been
successfully addressed in other bodies and addressing it by other means might
under certain circumstances appear more suitable to the parties. In this case there
was no need to use the DSM.
A matter that is related to this and may be of greater relevance is that many
potential cases are not filed under the WTO. The motivating factors which act as
deterrents from filing a complaint may be manifold. Involved costs of a dispute,
political obligation issues with the defendant and the fear of counter-suits may
6
The General Council is a body composed of all WTO Members with general authority to oversee
the agreements under the WTO. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism is a WTO review mechanism
aimed at domestic and international transparency in Members’ trade regimes. This is conducted by
regular reviews of Members’ trade regimes. Issues may be raised also if they are not covered by
WTO law (GOODE 2004).
7
Section 301 of U.S. Trade Act of 1974 is designed to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements
and to act against foreign unfair trade policies based on petition and investigation. It provides the
USTR (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) for limiting imports from countries that restrict
U.S. trade in an unfair manner (GOODE 2004).
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prevent potential complainants from filing a dispute. Complainants may also be
unwilling to bring cases forward, because they do not want to draw attention to
inconsistencies in their own WTO trade policies as argued by PETERSMANN
(1994) and REINHARDT (2000b). There might as well be cases where the parties to
the dispute may prefer to seek a cooperative settlement without notification to the
WTO because they feel that such a settlement ‘in the shadow of the law’ is more
likely (MNOOKIN 1998). Trade disputes usually are only observable after their
notification to the WTO.
If only a subsample of potential trade issues is brought to the WTO, this
might mean that there is something special about those that are brought (BUSCH
AND REINHARDT 2002). For instance, it could be the case that only the simple or
the sophisticated trade issues are considered. A sample selection bias would result
from this if the variables to explain dispute initiation were strongly correlated
with unobserved variables. (BUSCH AND REINHARDT 2002) propose an approach
to deal with this problem. They suggest considering the potential sources of
selection bias and then drawing the empirical implications to test these.
Furthermore, there is the problem of missing information on the existence
of WTO infringements over trade flows. Actually, the test of indicators of their
influence on dispute initiation should be related to identified WTO infringements.
However, there is no information available to identify the trade flows facing
disputable trade policies. Yet the identification issue itself may serve as a
constraint for several Members from participating in the system. Observations
related to the approach of counting official disputes only arise with the official
notification of ‘request for bilateral consultations’ by the parties to the dispute;
and the real number of issues that are addressed in informal consultations ‘in the
shadow of the law’ or that are not addressed at all cannot be observed. As a
consequence, the true population of WTO violations or ‘disputable trade
measures’ is unknown.
8
An approach that has been applied in several studies following the first
empirical investigation on dispute initiation under the WTO (HORN ET AL. 1999)
8
HORN ET AL. 1999 were the first using this term to refer to the number of WTO violations Members
may face. They used an aggregated approach based on Members’ number of trade flows with all
other WTO Members and worked on the assumption that infringements are uniformly distributed
over Members and commodities.
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is to work on the simplifying assumption that WTO infringements are uniformly
distributed over trade partners, markets and commodities. Most studies
(exceptions are e.g. BESSON and MEHDI 2004, BOWN 2005a and 2005b)
9
Furthermore, there are some data and measurement challenges that
empirical investigations on the issue face. First, precise information on the
affected market or commodities is often not available. This implies that the
economic stakes of a dispute are not easy to define, which is, however, essential
for the assessment of their relevance to the affected Members. Regarding analyses
on the successful resolution of disputes, information about the precise nature of
the settlement is often not available. The parties to the dispute usually notify the
WTO only of the existence of a settlement (BUSCH AND REINHARDT 2002).
Studies that are based on counting bilateral trade flows as potential trade
infringements face the problem that disputes may arise in the absence of trade
flows, e.g. because of banned trade on SPS grounds or because trade flows are not
collected for the sample as their value is reduced due to protectionist measures of
the violator. This is a weakness of this approach and has to be taken into
consideration for the interpretation of the model’s results.
work
on this approach. This entails that the estimation of dispute initiation is merged
with the estimation of the incidence of infringements. Hence, the influence of
incorporated variables on the likelihood to file a complaint cannot be completely
separated from the influence on the probability for the occurrence of trade
infringements. One approach to deal with this problem could be to exploit
information from reviews of Members’ trade policy regimes in the context of the
TPRM and to introduce variables that contain information on Members’ average
market protection. KEE ET AL. (2006) provide such a measure by calculating a
tariff equivalent of all protectionist measures that countries face and also impose
on their trade partners on average.
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BOWN (2005a) analyses countries’ probability to join disputes as interested third parties or co-
complainants. The approach is to start from WTO violations that are implemented on MFN-basis
and identify countries that are affected. The question is then why some affected countries join
disputes and others do not. The analysis is based on an ordered multinomial model. BOWN (2005b)
investigates the influencing factors for challenging trade remedy measures (those refer to
antidumping, safeguard and countervailing duty measures) imposed by the U.S. Almost all trade
remedies that have proceeded to a Panel or Appellate Body ruling have been found to have some
inconsistencies with WTO law. Hence, in an abridged sense the analysis is based on the assumption
that any imposed trade remedy measure can be challenged under the WTO or that the probability for
an inconsistency accounts for almost 100% in any trade remedy.
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Investigations about the system’s distortions in terms of impaired accessibility
toward certain types of Members essentially require a normative definition of the
conditions under which a trade issue should be brought to the WTO. Obviously,
this normative issue is at least partly politically driven and its ambiguity is
reflected in the ongoing negotiations on the improvement of the DSM both
encompassing more ‘rule oriented’ and more ‘power oriented’ systemic changes.
Assessments on a ‘biased use’ of the system – a widely used term in this context –
are to be based on a normative framework. This definition of fundamental reasons
on which dispute initiations should be based is not available to date. Descriptions
like ‘equal access’ are quite vague. The establishment of a comprehensive
economic modeling framework encompassing Members’ various trade and non-
trade-related incentives to use the DSM could provide a valuable basis for the
definition of such standards and also for the appraisal of the status quo. So far
there has been no such comprehensive economic modeling framework for dispute
initiation under the WTO.
1.3 Contributions of the thesis
The thesis encompasses two empirical chapters and a theory chapter. The two
empirical chapters have been published and throughout the thesis they are referred
to as if they were single studies. They are cited as GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) referring to
the first, and GÖTZ AND HECKELEI (2011) referring to the second chapter. The
empirical studies focus on the agro-food sector to account for a more in-depth
analysis of sector-specific characteristics. The theory paper draws on their
findings and on those of previous empirical studies to establish an economic
modeling framework and encompassing description of the drivers of the DSM.
Agro-food related trade issues account for about 25% of all WTO disputes
(WTO 2011b) and typically emerge in markets that have competitive
characteristics. They thereby are likely to differ from disputes in oligopolistic
markets, like, for example, the market for aircraft (BAGWELL AND STAIGER
2002). The drivers of dispute initiation may vary depending on characteristics on
the market, i.e. its market form, structure and the involved commodities. Hence, a
specialization of the investigation may be valuable in order to account for
differences between markets and also to be able to incorporate more specific
information on the related characteristics of the trade issues. Regarding special
Extended introduction
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attention to the interests of developing countries in the WTO, the agro-food sector
is especially relevant to them, as it typically accounts for a high share in their
economies. Special attention should be attributed to this sector, for, to date no
agro-food related complaint has been filed by the group of Least developed
countries.
GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) is the starting point and uses the binomial dispute
distribution model first applied by HORN ET AL. (1999). In addition to accounting
for indicators on Members’ legal capacity, financial means and their operating
experience with the system, it complements previous empirical studies by newly
introduced unilateral determinants. The sector-focus is reflected by the indicators
on the relevance of the agricultural sector and of the agro-food export sector.
Political economy issues are of particular relevance in agricultural markets, as
protectionism is often attributed to powerful farm lobbies. This issue is captured
by incorporating an indicator for the influence of private lobbying on
governmental decision. Also considered is a variable on governmental efficiency
to account for Members’ institutional capacity. This is seen as especially relevant
in the pre-litigation phase of disputes (see DAVIS AND BERMEO 2009). GÖTZ ET
AL. (2010) provide the first attempt to mitigate the problem of missing
information on WTO violations. This is implemented by the newly incorporated
variables on complainants’ own protectionist tendency and the level of
protectionism faced in their agro-food related trade flows.
Results show that Members’ own protectionist attitude lowers and the level
of their faced protectionism increases their likelihood to initiate disputes. The first
finding suggests that Members who are more inclined towards protectionism are
less prone to fight for market liberalization. It might also imply a strategically
intended caution, precisely not to provoke a counter-suit on their own WTO-
inconsistent trade policies. The second finding is in line with the system’s
objectives. Their operating experience with the system shows a significant
positive impact on their number of filed disputes. The relevance of Members’
operating experience can be rationalized with its decreasing influence on fixed
costs of disputes and on its positive influence on Members’ efficiency in
processing trade issues.
Bilaterally dependent characteristics should be in the center of interest as
they consider issues that might show a critical influence on the usage of the DSM.
Their influence on Members’ initiation probability is in the focus of the
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investigation of GÖTZ AND HECKELEI (2011) that builds upon GÖTZ ET AL.
(2010). GÖTZ AND HECKELEI (2011) provide the first purely bilateral model that
is based on Members’ whole sample of agro-food-related trade flows. They
extend the empirical analysis by bilaterally dependent indicators on the sector-
related trade between complainant and defendant, their relevance as trade partners
to each other and complainants’ trade retaliatory capacity. Complainant’s
retaliatory power and their dependency from exports and imports with respect to
the defendant’s market are especially relevant for enforcing compliance after a
successfully litigated complaint.
However, taking a pure bilateral approach in this context involves a serious
estimation problem. The binary choice approach requires at first a decision about
what should be compiled as observations. In the context of WTO disputes it is
obvious to compile Members’ different commodity-related bilateral export flows
with their trade partners, as a dispute could arise over infringements affecting a
single commodity. This involves the problem that the number of disputes is
vanishingly low compared to the number of observations in the sample. The
skewed sample leads to poor estimates of the relevant parameters (COSSLETT
1981).
A first approach to deal with this problem in the second empirical analysis
was to group Members in order to reduce the number of observations related to
the number of disputes. Members were grouped according to The World Bank
Atlas method of national income.
10
10
Income classes are: low income, $1,005 or less; lower middle income, $1,006 - $3,975; upper
middle income, $3,976 - $12,275; and high income, $12,276 or more. The description of The World
Bank income country classification method is available online at:
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications, 2011-10-04.
The resulting sample comprised 16 Member
group combinations, where data on their characteristics were averaged across the
group. The procedure was then to estimate Member groups’ probability to initiate
disputes against other Member groups. This approach solved the estimation
problem, however implicated a serious loss of information. Members with very
different characteristics are grouped together and the information contained in
their diversity is lost by this method. This unsatisfactory solution demanded for
further research on estimation methods bringing up the Weighted Endogenous
Sampling Maximum Likelihood (WESML) estimator developed by MANSKI AND
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LERMAN (1977). Their method is based on oversampling the infrequently
occurring event, which is a bilateral WTO dispute in this context. The included
sample selection bias is then corrected in the estimation process. The advantage of
this approach is twofold. First, it allows for more precise estimates than could be
obtained from the original sample and, second, all information in the data can be
preserved for the estimation, namely the variation in the parameters of interest
across Members.
Regarding the incorporated unilateral determinants, Members’ faced
protectionism, their operating experience with the system, and the influence of
private lobbying activities could be supported to show a positive effect on their
initiation probability. The finding on private lobbying influence shows that
Members’ environment for the private sector to communicate its trade interests to
the government matters. It thereby empirically confirms the findings of SHAFFER
(2003a and 2003b) on the importance of co-operation between the private and the
public sector for WTO adjudication and suggests the establishment of related
institutional structures. Of the bilateral trade-related characteristics, the positive
impact of Members’ Agro-food export dependency and their Agro-food import
value from the defendant could be substantiated. The first variable indicates the
defendant’s relevance as trade partner to the complainant. More important
markets are likely to imply a higher incentive to open them. The second
determinant reflects complaint’s capacity to threaten retaliation with respect to the
defendant’s market. Hence, complainants who have more retaliation power also
have a higher propensity to engage in disputes. Their greater retaliatory capacity
involves a greater probability for a successful solution of the trade issue in terms
of enforced compliance.
According to the author’s information, the theory chapter is to date the first
attempt to systematically integrate the findings of empirical studies from the
literature into an extensive theoretical framework for modeling the economic
incentives of the DSM. This comprehensive modeling framework may serve as a
tool for the appraisal of proposed systemic changes of the system and also as a
foundation for defining the criteria of equal accessibility of the DSM for all types
of Members.
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1.4 Identification of potentially relevant future research
Most insignificant findings of empirical studies, both from the literature as well as
of the thesis papers, may be due to weak proxies, especially regarding the
indicators on Members’ institutional capacity, their legal capacity and their
financial means. Their relevance is obvious and confirmed by the findings of case
studies or are stated by Members who see themselves constrained in their access
to the DSM (see e.g. HUSSAIN 2005, SOUTH CENTRE 1999); however, except for
(BESSON AND MEHDI 2004) on the issue of developing countries’ success in
disputes, no empirical study could support their influence. The problem is that
Members’ overall administrative power is difficult to assess, since the applied
indicators only refer to certain aspects of their domestic environment. The
aforementioned resources may substitute each other with respect to their function
for the use of the DSM. This aspect may be worth a more precise analysis. It
could reveal valuable information about the strategies that Members apply
depending on their constraints toward different resources.
It may be worthwhile to compare different sectors (agro-food sector vs.
industrial sector, manufactures vs. services) to learn if the drivers of the system
change with respect to the traded commodities or market forms (e.g. competitive
markets vs. oligopolistic markets). This might also apply when different Member
groups are compared. Members’ incentives or the characteristics of the disputed
trade issues may depend on their economic development and resource
endowment.
An issue that may be intricate to address is that of cases that are not brought
to the WTO. Questions related to this are, whether there is a considerable amount
of trade issues which are not adjudicated under the WTO, and why Members file
cases at the WTO while they prosecute others unilaterally or settle them in a
cooperative way. A further question is why some disputes are settled with
liberalization while there is no change in the defendant’s trade regime in others
(BUSCH AND REINHARDT 2002).
Most Least developed countries are not only absent as complainants but
also as defendants. It is unlikely that the latter is due to their full compliance with
WTO rules. WTO inconsistent policy measures may not be revealed by the
system caused by its own incentives. Small markets and thereby small trade
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stakes may not justify costly WTO adjudication. To date, this issue of unrevealed
protectionism has not been addressed in studies.
The system’s public good characteristics provide incentives for free-
ridership. Free-ridership may provide an additional rationale for some Members
not to file disputes by themselves but to save the costs of the dispute. The benefits
of a successful ruling in their interest may accrue to them as well. The most
appropriate way to address this question may be by case studies. BOWN (2005a)
provides an empirical approach that is related to this issue.
A more general question is whether the greater legalization of the WTO
system made dispute settlement more effective. This question about effectiveness
is not only related to the number of issues adjudicated under the WTO, but
especially to the liberalization outcome. As notifications on settlement outcomes
to the WTO usually are not very precise, this issue may be very difficult to
address with a quantitative approach.
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2 What makes countries initiate WTO disputes on
food-related issues?
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Abstract
This paper analyses relevant determinants for the probability to initiate a
dispute on policy measures under the World Trade Organization (WTO)
dispute settlement system. The empirical analysis differs from existing
assessments by focusing on agro-food related disputes and provides a more in-
depth analysis of specific country and sectoral characteristics not considered in
previous studies. Contrary to recent analyses of overall trade disputes, the
results show that some determinants such as legal capacity and monetary
means are not statistically significant. Own protectionist behavior, endured
protectionism, and the duration of WTO membership, however, could be
identified as relevant determinants with the expected direction of impact.
Key words: WTO dispute, Agro-food sector, Binary choice model
JEL Classification: C12, C13, C25, Q17, Q18
2.1 Introduction
The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was set
into force as a part of the WTO Agreement on January 1, 1995. It is the device for
the resolution of conflicts arising between Members over the interpretation of
their commitments under the regime of the organization. Dispute settlement must
be self-enforcing, i.e. from the consultation to the potential compliance phase all
actions are driven by Members. Referred to as the “central pillar of the
multilateral trading system” (WTO 2007a) the design of the WTO dispute
settlement system is central to the debate on institutional reforms of the WTO and
has also been under negotiation at the current WTO Doha round of negotiations.
A major desire is to make the settlement system more effective and to allow for
the appropriate consideration of developing countries’ demands. Reform
proposals span a wide field from tightening time frames regarding panel
proceedings over more effectively dealing with compliance and compensation
procedures to assistance for developing countries ensuring their equality of
11
This chapter was published as GÖTZ C., HECKELEI T. AND B. RUDLOFF (2010): What makes
countries initiate WTO disputes on food-related issues? Food Policy 35 (2010), pp.154-162.
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opportunity (PETERMAN 2003). However, the understanding of the factors that
drive the system is required for targeted improvement.
The question addressed in this paper is, therefore, which Members’
characteristics explain their activity as complainants in WTO food-related trade
disputes. Compared to previous empirical studies, this investigation provides an
in-depth analysis of food-related disputes and considers new potential
determinants that may supplement the understanding of what drives the use of the
dispute settlement system. The empirical investigation is based on a dispute
distribution model developed and employed by HORN ET AL. (1999).
This paper is organized as follows: After a short description of the WTO
dispute settlement’s features and the food-related caseload of the investigation
period, a survey on existing empirical studies is provided. The model
specification, including a discussion of considered determinants, is described in
the next chapter. Statistical implementation and estimation results are
subsequently presented before concluding.
2.2 Facts and figures on WTO dispute settlement
All Members are provided with equal right to seek adjudication through the WTO
dispute settlement system. Acceptable reasons for filing a complaint are a trading
partner’s measures that nullify the benefits or impair the attainment of any
objective of one or more of the WTO agreements. The system’s rules and
procedures generally are administered by the General Council, i.e. the plenary
meeting of the WTO at the level of governmental officials, which turns itself into
the Dispute Settlement Body when adjudicating trade disputes. Dispute settlement
procedures are stricter under the WTO compared to those in force under its
predecessor GATT 1947. This is due to the elimination of blocking or delaying
tactics through the adoption of time limits for all stages of adjudication, the
implementation of standard terms of reference for panels, and an improved
mechanism for enforcement of compliance with panel rulings (HOEKMAN AND
KOSTEKI 2001). This is in particular owing to the implementation of the so called
‘negative consensus’, which means that a panel is established, a panel report
What makes countries initiate WTO disputes on food-related issues?
20
adopted, or the complainant authorized to trade related retaliation unless the DSB
decides by consensus to reject.
12
The consequences of this reform are reflected by economists’ notion of the
new multilateral trading system as a more “rules-oriented” compared to the more
“power-oriented” system of the GATT 1947 (e.g. JACKSON 1997; PETERSMANN
1997, TREBILCOCK AND HOWSE 1999). However, there exists empirical evidence
on the relevance of power-based relationships between Members (e.g. BESSON
AND MEHDI 2004, BOWN 2004a), thereby challenging that the new system
adequately considers the economic inequalities of its Members.
In the area of food-related disputes, 147 cases have been initiated over the
period from January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2006.
13
Regarding country participation
the figures on current and previous food-related WTO disputes reveal that the
majority of cases are related to the economically advanced countries. Table 2.1
shows the participation pattern by development classification of the UNITED
NATIONS (2008) for the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2006.
14
The Members
of the European Communities are not separately captured in the statistic, thus
reducing the number of WTOMembers to 134 instead of 149
15
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The ‘Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’ is laid down
in Annex 2 of the ‘Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization’ from April
15, 1994.
.
13
These 147 cases refer to nine different Agreements related to issues on food, see footnote 7.
14
The developing status according to the WTO is based on members’ self-declaration and not on
verified economic attributes.
15
The European Communities comprised 15 Members until April 30, 2004. Disputes of its 10 new
Members from May 1, 2004 on are captured separately and not assigned to the EC in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Food-related dispute initiations by development classification until
June 30, 2006
Group
No. of
Members
Share in
membership
No. of
Disputes
Share in
disputes
Developed 31 0,23 97 0,66
Developing 71 0,53 50 0,34
Least Developed 32 0,24 0 0
Total 134 147
Source: Own compilation based on WORLD TRADEORGANIZATION (2007b) and UNITED NATIONS
(2008)
Representing 23% of the WTO membership, the group of developed countries are
the most active users with 66% of all initiated food-related disputes. 34% of all
disputes are initiated by the large group of developing countries. The group of
Least Developed Countries
16
As there exists no established principle for the assignment of the developed
or developing status in the United Nations system, a pattern which more precisely
defines the economic status refers to the World Bank classification of income
levels
accounts for about 24% of WTO Members, but they
did not use the system at all for food related issues. This is remarkable since food-
sector related exports generally represent a substantial share in their export
structure.
17
16
32 of currently 150 WTO members are classified as Least Developed Countries. The
identification of their status by the United Nations is dependent on the following economic criteria:
(1) a low per capita income criterion, (2) a human resource weakness criterion and (3) an economic
vulnerability criterion (United Nations, 2007).
. Table 2.2 depicts the initiation pattern related to per capita income
groups.
17
Per capita income classification according to The World Bank (2008): Low income: $875 or less,
Lower Middle Income: $876-3465, Upper Middle Income: $3466-10,725, High Income: >$10,726.
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Table 2.2: Food-related dispute initiations by per capita income classes until
June 30, 2006
Per capita income
class
No. of
Members
Share in
membership
No. of
Disputes
Share in
disputes
High income 25 0.19 91 0.62
Upper middle income 30 0.22 20 0.14
Lower middle income 36 0.27 31 0.21
Low income 43 0.32 5 0.03
Total 134 147
Source: Own compilation based on WORLD TRADEORGANIZATION (2007b) and WORLD BANK (2008)
High income Members initiated 62% of all food-related disputes. Members of the
Upper middle and Lower middle income groups account for about 25% of all
initiated disputes, whereas Members of the Low income group are almost
completely absent. The United States and the European Union dominate the High
income group, followed by Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Philippines and Thailand in the Middle income groups, and India in the
Low income group are examples for comparatively active users of the system.
As is evident from the brief description above, the WTO dispute settlement
system’s rules themselves do not discriminate between Members and offer equal
opportunities for dispute initiation. Therefore, it is of some interest to investigate
what are the major determinants for observing this pattern of dispute initiation
across countries and whether other than the most prominent attribute “income”
may influence a Member’s decision to file a complaint.
2.3 Empirical analyses on general dispute initiation
A few empirical assessments on the WTO initiation of disputes exist considering
various determinants, agreements referred to, and roles in a dispute (complainant,
defendant, co-complainant and interested party). Table 2.3 depicts their
investigation period, dispute coverage, main issue of analysis and the models
used. Table 2.4 comprises the detected influences of determinants under previous
investigations.
HORN ET AL. (1999) mark the first empirical investigation by using a
binomial dispute distribution model. According to their analysis the dispute
initiation pattern is to a large extent reflected by the pattern of export diversity
and value. GDP did not reveal a significant influence, but a country’s legal
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capacity shows a slight positive influence on its probability to complain. BESSON
AND MEHDI (2004) find empirical evidence that legal capacity matters with
respect to a country’s likelihood to win disputes. This supports the conclusion of
BUSCH AND REINHARDT (2003) that early settlements of developing countries, i.e.
in the consultation stage or in the Panel stage before a ruling, are missing due to
the lack of legal capacity.
Table 2.3: Survey on investigation period, dispute coverage, main issue and
used model of previous empirical studies
Empirical study
Investigation period
and dispute coverage
Main issue of
analysis
Used model
Horn et al. (1999) WTO disputes; 1995-
1998; 155
complaints; all
agreements
Determinants for the
initiation of
complaints
Binomial Dispute
Distribution Model
Holmes et al.
(2003)
WTO disputes; 1995-
2002; 279
complaints; all
agreements
Involvement in
complaints (both
sides) and success in
disputes
Descriptive statistics
Bown (2004a) GATT & WTO
disputes; 1973-1998;
174 complaints; all
agreements
Determinants for
compliance after
trade disputes
Linear regression
Bown (2004b) GATT & WTO
disputes; 1992-2003;
complaints against
U.S. trade remedies
Initiation of
complaints against
U.S. trade remedies
Probit Model
Besson & Mehdi
(2004)
WTO disputes; 1995-
2002; 40 complaints
of developing against
developed countries
Success in disputes:
Developing against
developed countries
Probit Model
Bown (2005) WTO disputes; 1995-
2000; 54 complaints;
complaints against
import protection on
MFN-basis
Engagement as Co-
Complainant or
Interested third party
Ordered Multinomial
Logit Model
Source: Own compilation
The self-enforcing nature of the dispute settlement system has been the starting
point for BOWN (2004a, 2004b and 2005): A focus lies on costs of running a
dispute and a country’s retaliation power to finally enforce compliance by penalty
tariffs on imports of the condemned party. BAGWELL AND STAIGER (2000) and
DAM (1970) state that the retaliation threat always has been a central component
of the GATT system. The success of this power is linked to the countries’
relevance as trade partner and there exists also theoretical support that the
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retaliation threat is not uniformly distributed over Members and that imbalances
relating to trade volume and market size shows influence on their force under
trade disputes. BOWN (2002) demonstrates that a country’s capacity to influence
its terms-of-trade determines the credibility of its retaliation threat which is
confirmed as well by JOHNSON (1953) and KENNAN AND RIEZMAN (1988).
BOWN (2005) concentrates on the question whether to join complaints as
co-complainant or interested party and demonstrated a positive impact of the
capacity to absorb legal costs on both decisions. Additionally, he identifies a
positive effect of a Member’s retaliatory capacity in terms of its relevance as
trading partner and a negative impact of countries’ dependencies on bilateral
development aid. BOWN (2004c) shows that the threat of retaliation is significant
for determining whether a government chooses to abide by its international
obligations. BOWN (2004b) demonstrates that the successful economic resolution
to disputes is influenced by the threat of retaliation by the complainant. In respect
of developing countries success in disputes BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) discover
empirical support for the influence of their trade retaliation power.
Market access and exporting interests are expected to be relevant for the
decision on initiation or participation and there exists empirical substantiation for
this. BOWN (2005) provides support for the positive impact of a country’s volume
of exports at stake in its decision to attend disputes as co-complainant or
interested third party and BOWN (2004d) demonstrates its positive influence on
the likelihood to complain against United States (U.S.) imposed trade remedies.
In the broader sense there is evidence for the relevance of trade volume or share
respectively. HOLMES, ROLLO AND YOUNG (2003) reach the conclusion that a
Member’s trade volume determines its likelihood to file complaints on the basis
of simple descriptive statistics. This supports the findings of HORN ET AL. (1999)
that trade volume and export diversity are closely correlated.
BOWN (2004a) finds only limited confirmation that international
obligations affect a country’s decision to fulfill its commitments whereas BOWN
(2005) finds empirical evidence on the positive influence of a Member’s
international economic relationships – measured by its engagement in preferential
trade agreements – on its decision to formally engage in a dispute as co-
complainant or interested third party. On the topic of success in disputes, the
results of BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) suggest that international economic
relationships show influence on a Member’s likelihood to win and they conclude
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that the reliance on bilateral assistance has a negative impact on the success.
Further, they discuss the impact of military power and find confirmation for the
negative influence that military powerful defendants have on the performance of
developing countries in dispute.
Table 2.4: Survey on findings of previous empirical studies
Influence on the likelihood to
Determinant Empirical study
Initiate
dispute
Partake in
initiated
disputes
Win a
dispute
Reach
compliance
after ruling
Export diversity
Horn et al. (1999)
+
Exporting interest
Bown (2005)
+
Export volume
Holmes et al. (2003)
+
Gross Domestic
Product
Bown (2005)
+
Horn et al. (1999)
0
Political economy
relationship with
respondent
Bown (2004b)
0
Bown (2005)
+
Besson and Mehdi (2004)
-
Reliance on
bilateral
assistance
Besson and Mehdi (2004)
-
Bown (2005)
-
Legal capacity
Horn et al. (1999)
+
Besson and Mehdi (2004)
+
Military power
Bown (2004b)
+
Besson and Mehdi (2004)
+
Retaliatory
capacity
Bown (2004d)
+
Bown (2005)
+
Besson and Mehdi (2004)
0
+ positive influence; - negative influence; 0 no influence
Source: Own compilation.
2.4 Assessing relevance of determinants
2.4.1.A binomial dispute initiation model
This analysis is based on the model first presented by HORN ET AL. (1999): The
initiation decision is described through a binary choice model in which the
Member’s probability to complain against another Member is dependent on a set
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of the complainant’s traits or the characteristics of its specific environment. The
implicated conditional probability function for this binary choice situation is the
Bernoulli distribution
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
for 1,
1
, 1
1 for 0.
i i ij
ij ij
ij i i i i i
i i ij
y
y y
f y
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(2.1)
where
ij
y is the binary dependent variable which takes 1 for a complaint and 0
for no complaint,
β
denotes the vector of K coefficients,
i
and
j
indicate the
complainant and the defendant respectively. The set of K influences is merged in
vector
i
x
. Function
( )
xβ
i i
π
calculates the individual probability to complain for
a prospective complainant
i
which can be represented by any cumulative
probability distribution function. Here, we use the widely employed conditional
logistic distribution,
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i
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i
π =
+
xβ
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, (2.2)
which would result in the well-known Logit model when applied to single trials.
The proceeding for the assessment of determinants is the reproduction of
the observed sample of dispute initiation over the period from January 1, 1995 to
June 30, 2006 based on a dispute distribution function which yields probabilities
for positive integers, i.e. the number of a Member’s initiated disputes. Assuming
that the probability for a litigation decision
( )
i i
π xβ
is constant from one trial to
the next and that successive trials are independent, Member probability for
complaints in trials against all other WTO Members is then specified
through the Binomial distribution
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where . The expected number of Member complaints against all
other WTO Members is then given by the expected value of the Binomial
distribution,
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which is strictly proportional to the number of independent Bernoulli trials .
The applied method is maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. Assuming
that the data drawn from this Binomial distribution is independent and identically
distributed with unknown parameter
β
, the likelihood function, i.e. the joint
probability density of observing the given sample of complaints is
specified by
( )
( ) ( )
1
, , 1
m
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i i i
i i i i i i i
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i
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Starting from the logarithmic likelihood function
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the first order conditions for a maximum are
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Restricting the vector of determinants to a constant, the probability to
complain reduces to
( )
i i
π π=xβ
for all Members and can be determined
analytically by solving the first derivative of equation (2.6) with respect to
leading to . Hence, for the restricted model, the maximum likelihood
estimator of the probability to initiate a dispute is simply the number of observed
complaints over the total number of independent Bernoulli trials.
The definition of the number of independent Bernoulli trials requires
information about the exact number of infringements that each Member faces, as
the aforementioned binary choice model refers to the litigation decision when
WTO obligations are violated. For the reason that we have no a priori information
about the existence of inconsistent trade measures – their existence can merely be
assured after a positive Dispute Settlement Body or Appellate Body ruling – the
analysis is based on an assumption about their distribution. For HORN ET AL.
(1999) the number of independent Bernoulli trials is dependent on a country’s
export diversification, i.e. its number of different exported goods over all products
and trading partners under the regime of the WTO. Each counted bilateral export
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n
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flow is considered as one trial. They worked on the assumption that “disputable
trade measures” (DTM) are uniformly distributed over all bilateral export flows.
The problem of this approach is that the determinants for the occurrence of
disputes cannot be separately identified from the impacts on the existence of
DTM, leading to an “export diversity bias”, i.e. an increase in disputes with
increasing export diversity. This problem already was a central criticism of
HOLMES ETAL. (2003).
Following the approach of HORN ET AL. (1999) we try to mitigate the
problem of missing information about the distribution of infringements by
incorporating two new indicators: Endured Protectionism by Trade Partner and
Own Imposed Protectionism. In addition to this information on the likelihood of
DTM in export flows, the attempt of HORN ET AL. (1999) to select the relevant
export flows is slightly modified by taking empirical instead of parameterized
values for average induced litigation costs into account.
2.4.2.Determinants considered
Deviating from existing studies, this paper focuses specifically on agricultural and
food-related disputes in order to develop an in-depth analysis of determinants
relevant in this sector and to additionally introduce new potential determinants.
The set of determinants or countries’ traits already used in prior studies is
reflected by agricultural trade flows characterizing the export diversity, a
country’s wealth and its legal capacity. Due to limited data availability for some
determinants under investigation the Members sample is limited to 53 while
maintaining the distribution over income classes.
Disputes data
Dispute initiations were collected that affected products of the food sector.
18
18
Agricultural and food related issues comprise initiated disputes which were raised under the
following agreements: Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Regulations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Agreement on Safeguards, General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Agreement
on Trade Related Investment Measures, Anti-Dumping-Agreement and the Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures.
The
investigation covers the period from January 1, 1995, to June 30, 2006. Each
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initiation is counted once to avoid double counting, thus omitting re-uptakes of
disputes that occur when the consultation period of 12 months is exceeded. For
jointly filed initiations, each participant is assigned one dispute. When one
Member simultaneously requests for consultations on the same subject but with
different defendants each one is counted on its own. Since the European
Communities (EC) is a single customs union with a harmonized trade policy and
common tariffs all disputes initiated by its Members are assigned to the EC. On
the other hand, when disputes are initiated against several EC Members there is
only one dispute assigned, including all defendants. The number of disputes for
each Member is related to the whole investigation period,
, (2.8)
where is the time-corrected number of disputes of Member , assigns
Member observed disputes over its WTO membership time and stands
for the investigation period. This proceeding is self-evident, since the number of
filed disputes ought to be linked to a Member’s membership time in the WTO. By
this means the time-bias is taken care of.
Export diversity
Here we adopt the approach first presented by HORN ET AL. (1999). Members’
export diversity is calculated as the average number of their bilateral agro-food
related export flows per year. The average is taken over the investigation period
1995-2006 and different thresholds on bilateral export value apply. Strictly
speaking, export diversification is not an explanatory variable, but an intrinsic
component of the underlying binomial dispute distribution model as the total
number of trials depends on the number of export flows. HORN ET AL. (1999)
found empirical support for the dependency of a Member’s activity as
complainant from its export diversity, i.e. its number of different exported goods
over all trading partners. The underlying principle lies in the expectation of an
increased probability to encounter infringements if a Member’s export diversity
increases. This is self-evident if we assume infringements to be uniformly
distributed over all markets, products and trading partners. Hence, we expect the
number of disputes to be positively related to Members’ amount of different
bilateral export flows. The export diversification factor’s explanatory contribution
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content is just confirmable by excluding all other variables as the expected
number of complaints is proportional to the number of a country’s export flows.
With this approach, export diversity might be underestimated for countries
experiencing banned trade on SPS-grounds. This is a limitation of the analysis,
however, it is mitigated to some extent by taking the average of Members’
number of export flows per year. Export flows come from EUROCARE (2006)
available at HS
19
Endured protectionism by trade partner
-4-level.
This is to our knowledge the first empirical effort to incorporate information
about the distribution of WTO-inconsistent trade barriers to reduce the lack of
information about the existence of actual infringements which is the precondition
to each dispute. It is assumed that the more protective the trade policy of a
country’s trading partners is, the higher the probability that it faces disputable
trade barriers. Hence, we expect the number of initiated disputes to be positively
related to a country’s faced trade restrictiveness. For this purpose the Market
Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI) provided by KEE,
NICITA AND OLARREAGA (2006) is used. It compromises a tariff equivalent of all
barriers in the agro-food sector that exporters of the respective country face on
average across the rest of the world. The indicator refers to data stemming from
1995-1998 concerning the non-tariff component and from 2000-2004 for the tariff
component of the aggregated MA-OTRI.
Own protectionist behavior
Another hypothesis is that the number of its filed disputes is negatively related to
a country’s tendency towards protectionism. The rationale behind this is the
assumption that a more protective Member faces also a greater likelihood to
become “victim” of an accusation. We presume a more protective country to
pursue a defensive and peaceful strategy to not provoke to be challenged itself.
On the other hand we hypothesize that more protective countries have a lower
propensity to fight for market liberalization. For this purpose the Overall Trade
Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) by KEE, NICITA AND OLARREAGA (2006) is used as
19
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System of the World Customs Organization
(WCO)
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a measure for a country’s inclination to restrictive policies. It is a tariff equivalent
for all trade barriers in the agro-food sector which the respective country imposes
in average upon the rest of the world. Consequently, it provides the mirror image
of the aforementioned MA-OTRI indicator, measuring the trade restrictiveness
from the potential complainant’s perspective and refers on the same period.
Relevance of the agricultural sector
Independent from a country’s contact to a trading partner we expect the overall
importance of the agricultural sector having a positive influence on initiating a
case: the higher the overall economic relevance, the more sensitive a country may
be regarding violations. To quantify the sector’s importance the agricultural share
of a Member’s GDP is employed. This rather crude indicator is used due to
missing data on the value of the countries’ food industry. An improved measure
should comprise information on the relevance of a Member’s whole agro-food
sector. The data is drawn from the UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
ANDDEVELOPMENT (2002 and 2003).
Importance of the agro-food export sector
Since disputes are dependent on agro-food related trade, the relevance of
Members’ agricultural sector is complemented by an indicator on the importance
of their agro-food exports. The hypothesis is that the more important Members’
agro-food export sector, the higher their general incentive to fight for their agro-
food related export interests. Hence, their number of observed disputes is
expected to be positively related to this importance. Members’ importance of the
agro-food export sector is measured as the share of agro-food related export value
in their total export value. The data comes from WORLD BANK (2007). The
indicator represents an average over the investigation period, i.e. the average
share of Members’ export value in total exports.
It has been suggested by an anonymous referee that the incentive to
complain could also be positively related to country size or the share of a
Member’s agro-food exports in world trade. We generally agree with this
possibility, but would argue that the relative importance of the agricultural food
export sector is more closely related to the incentive than the size. Furthermore, in
the next subsection, we use the GDP to measure the capacity to absorb legal cost.
This is clearly a variable measuring country size. Consequently the GDP
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potentially also picks up an effect related to a Member’s incentive to complain
that is not captured by the relative importance of the agro-food export sector.
Capacity to absorb legal costs/wealth
The capacity to absorb legal costs is supposed to be essential for the
accomplishment of disputes as explicit compensation for litigation costs is not
intended by the system. Even though the expected gains from removing the trade
barrier exceed the induced litigation costs, this potential payoff lies ahead and is
uncertain. For this reason each potential complainant must anticipate substantial
costs that are involved by prosecution and, if applicable, also by enforcement of
compliance. It is assumed that the number of complaints is positively related to a
Member’s capacity to absorb legal costs. As proxy for such financial means we
use a country’s Gross Domestic Product in US-Dollars, provided by the WORLD
BANK (2007). The indicator is an average of Members’ yearly reported GDP over
the investigation period.
Legal capacity
One argument often raised to explain the limited access of the system to
developing and low income countries is their lack of human and legal capacity
(see e.g. WHALLEY, 1996). HORN ET AL. (1999) found empirical evidence on the
matter of a country’s legal capacity in respect of initiating disputes. We
hypothesize that the larger a country’s endowment with skilled legal personnel,
the higher its capability to challenge arguable trade measures of its trading
partners and we expect the number of bilateral complaints to be positively linked.
The respective determinant should comprise the whole extent of a country’s trade
administration, i.e. its budget, its staff’s size and quality. Since there is no
differentiated information on Members’ legal capability we use, like HORN ET AL.
(1999), their delegation size at Geneva as proxy. The respective information
comes from the UNITED NATIONS (2004). The indicator provides information on
the status of Members’ permanent delegation in 2004, however it is alleged that
this endowment represents their administrative power over the investigation
period.
Some other potential indicators on Members’ ability to follow through with
a case have been considered as well but were discarded due to data availability
issues. Since disputes on SPS-matters are incorporated in the sample, Members’
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scientific capacity could play a role to make a good case in such disputes. A
possible objection to this rationale is that skilled personnel can reside in one
Member state but be under contract for another Member in WTO matters. To
capture the aspect of scientific capacity, indicators on Members’ expenditure on
research and development, on their total number of researchers and on their
number of published scientific and journal articles have been compiled from
WORLD BANK (2007). Unfortunately, the three indicators are not available for all
Members in the sample and could therefore not be incorporated. However, it is
likely that almost all information will be captured by Members’ GDP as this is
highly correlated with the three indicators for the overlapping observations (pair
wise correlation all > 0.98). Consequently, a potentially significant influence of
the GDP will include the influence of available legal capacity to some extent.
Influence of private actors and governmental efficiency
The influence of private pressure groups on the government is relevant as only the
government may finally enter a dispute but can be persuaded by private actors in
doing so. This power may differ among countries depending on the national
framework for organizing private lobby activities and on their respective
relevance. It is increasingly seen as especially relevant for developing countries in
determining the use of the settlement system (SHAFFER 2003a; BOWN AND
HOEKMAN 2005). SHAFFER (2003a and 2003b) demonstrate the relevance of
private-public partnerships for the initiation and prosecution of trade disputes at
the WTO and BESSON ANDMEHDI (2004) argue that domestic variables should be
incorporated to handle the potential sources of distortion of the dispute settlement
procedure.
To our knowledge this is the first empirical attempt to capture some aspects
of the aforementioned interaction between the public and the private sector
regarding dispute initiation. For this purpose two domestic variables are included
which are provided by KAUFMANN (2004): (i) the Corporate Legal Corruption
Component (CLCC), measuring legal dimensions of undue political influence by
the private sector and (ii) the Judicial/Legal Effectiveness Integrity Index (JLEI),
assessing the effectiveness and integrity of the legal and judicial system. The
greater the influence of lobbyists, e.g. by legal political finance or by the voice of
interests of powerful firms, the more successful the private sector is supposed to
be in achieving its export interests. Accordingly, the number of challenged
disputes should be positively correlated to the amount of undue influence,
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aggregated in the CLCC variable. It is hypothesized, that the higher the efficiency
and integrity of the legal and judicial system of a country, the higher its ability to
identify illegal trade measures and to pursue a legal action. Hence, the probability
for litigation is presumed to be positively dependent on the JLEI variable.
Membership time
The time of membership may be negatively related to the costs of filing a dispute
as learning occurs. Hence, we suspect a Member’s experience through its
membership in the WTO to be positively related to its number of filed disputes.
An index is created over the time since the inception of the organization until June
30, 2006, relating each Member’s membership time to the whole observation
period. The associated data is from WTO (2007c).
The following table provides a survey on all explanatory variables with
their respective data source and expected impact on the initiation of disputes.
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Table 2.5: Survey on explanatory variables, data and expected sign
Explanatory variables Data Source
Expected
sign
Export diversity* Census of different export
flows on HS-4 level
EuroCARE (2006) (+)
Capacity to absorb
legal costs/wealth*
Gross Domestic Product World Bank (2007) +
Legal capacity* Size of permanent delegation
at Geneva
United Nations (2004) +
Influence of private
actors
Measure of legal dimensions
of undue political influence by
the private sector
Kaufmann (2004): Corporate
Legal Corruption Component
(CLCC)
+
Governmental
efficiency
Measure of effectiveness and
integrity of the legal and
judicial system
Kaufmann (2004): Legal and
Judicial Effectiveness and
Integrity Index (LJEI)
+
Relevance of the
agricultural sector
Percentage share of GDP
produced in agriculture
UNCTAD - Statistical
Yearbook (2002, 2003)
+
Importance of agro-
food export sector
Share of agro-food related
export value in total export
value
Word Bank (2007) +
Endured
protectionism by trade
partner
Average endured tariff
equivalent
Kee, Nicita, Olarreaga (2006):
Overall Trade Restrictiveness
Index (OTRI)
+
Own imposed
protectionism
Average imposed tariff
equivalent
Kee, Nicita, Olarreaga (2006):
Market Access Overall Trade
Restrictiveness Index (MA-
OTRI)
_
WTO membership
time
Index based on a member's
percentage membership share
over investigation period
World Trade Organization
(2007c)
+
* Influencing factors already integrated in previous empirical investigations
Source: Own compilation.
2.5 Statistical Implementation and Results
For the restricted model, the probability to complain is identical for all Members
and its estimate only dependent on the number of all observed disputes and of the
sum of bilateral export flows between all trading partners. Hence, improved
model prediction is merely owing to changes in the distribution of export flows
over Members by weighing the relevant exports flows, i.e. introducing thresholds
for accounting only export flows beyond a certain value. The average number of
export flows declines from 4254 in case of no threshold to 489 when the highest
threshold of $700K is used. The fit of the model is measured by two different
indicators: the fraction of exact predictions and the mean of absolute deviation
(MAD) between observed and predicted disputes

1
i i
MAD c c
m
= −
∑
, (2.9)
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where denotes the number of observed and the number of predicted
disputes of Member and assigns the sample size of 53 Members.
The fraction of exact predictions (FEP) rises from 0.13 to 0.43 and thereby
shows an increased fit of the model by imposing a threshold of $300K but the
MAD remains almost unchanged. The model’s fit is not improved by imposing
higher thresholds than $300K as the MAD remains almost unchanged around 2
and the FEP is only raised from 0.43 under threshold $300K to 0.45 under
threshold $700K. Contrary to HORN ET AL. (1999) this result shows that the
selection of trade flows is only relevant for the difference between no threshold
and the lowest threshold of $300K, but seems not to be relevant for the selection
at higher values of trade in the agro-food sector. Hence, their findings that the
pattern of dispute initiation is to a large extent reflected by differences in
Members’ diversity and value of trade is only partially supported by our result for
the agro-food sector. Table 2.6 comprises the results for the restricted model.
Table 2.6: Results for the restricted model subject to different thresholds for
export flows
Threshold on
export flow
value
Number of export flows
Mean of
absolute
deviations
Fraction of
exact
predictionsmin max avg
$0
Beta0 -5.28
126 54,965 4254 2.00 0.13Prob 0.0006
$300K
Beta0 -5.28
23 15,514 712 2.02 0.43Prob 0.0035
$500K
Beta0 -5.28
19 12,821 572 2.00 0.45Prob 0.0043
$700K
Beta0 -5.28
18 11,146 489 2.04 0.45Prob 0.0051
Number of observations: 53
Source: Own compilation.
For the unrestricted model, the Akaike information criterion is used to select the
relevant variables. Based on this, the incorporation of additional variables is
traded off against the increased fit of the model. By incorporating additional
explanatory variables the goodness of fit is improved regardless of the number of
free parameters in the data generating process. The indicator penalizes increasing
complexity thus mitigating the danger of over-fitting. It is then sought after the
i
c

i
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model specification showing the lowest information criterion value. All different
model specifications are evaluated, i.e. all specifications are estimated and their
corresponding information criterion value calculated. For each threshold the best
specification, i.e. that one yielding the lowest information criterion value, is then
selected and subject to a test on joint significant influence. For the best model
under each threshold, standard errors of the coefficients are derived using
bootstrap methods. The quality of the unrestricted model is further on validated
by a likelihood ratio test. In this process the logarithmic likelihood function value
of the unconstrained ML estimator

β , is compared with the likelihood function
value of the constrained ML estimator

β
, which is obtained by maximizing the
logarithmic likelihood function subject to the linear restrictions

0 0
k
kβ = ∀ ≠ .
The LR test statistic is computed as

( )

( )
2 ln , , ln ,
i i i i i
LR L c n L c n
 
= −
 
β x β
, (2.10)
which has a Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of imposed restrictions.
20
According to this proceeding six of the considered determinants are
retained in the final model: (1) Endured protectionism, (2) Own imposed
protectionism, (3) Legal capacity, (4) Influence of private actors, (5) WTO
membership time and the (6) Importance of the agro-food sector result in a
sufficient increase in the goodness of fit for no threshold. For the application of
all higher thresholds the variable Legal capacity is discarded in the selection
process whereas the other indicators are included in the specification. Table 2.7
comprises the results for the selected specifications of the unrestricted model
subject to different thresholds for export flows. The standard errors are given in
brackets behind the respective coefficients. All included variables show the
hypothesized sign. The influence of Endured protectionism, Own imposed
protectionism and WTO membership time is proven to be statistically significant
20
Estimation, selection of variables, the likelihood ratio test and the bootstrap re-sampling and
testing procedure are implemented in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System), see BROOKE,
A., KENDRICK, D., MEERAUS, A. AND R. RAMAN (1998): GAMS – A User’s Guide, GAMS
Development Corporation, Washington, DC. The standard errors of the coefficients are calculated
for 2000 re-sampling iterations.
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for the thresholds $300K to $700K; for the lowest threshold only Endured
protectionism and Own imposed protectionism show a significant influence. The
variables’ joint significant influence is verified by an asymptotic significance test
based on the bootstrapped sampling distribution of the estimator (see EFRON AND
TIBSHIRANI 1993). Compared to the restricted model, the FEP is substantially
higher for the lowest and slightly higher for the remaining thresholds. The MAD
between observed and predicted complaints is substantially lower under all
thresholds compared to the restricted model. This is mainly due to improved
model behavior for Members with a large number of observed disputes,
predominantly for the EC and the U.S. Both measures show that the model
amendment is much higher for the $300K threshold and the specification without
threshold.
Table 2.7: Results for unrestricted specification selections subject to different
thresholds for export flows
Threshold on export flow value
Explanatory variable $0 $300K $500K $700K
Beta 0 -13,46 -11,45 -11,29 -11,17
Endured protectionism by trade
partner
2.54* 3.60*** 3.73*** 3.83***
(1.57) (1.35) (1.39) (1.41)
Own imposed protectionism
-2.34* -2.44** -2.45** -2.43**
(1.21) (1.21) (1.21) (1.21)
Legal capacity
0.92 not not not
(1.04) included included included
Influence of private actors
0.96 0.45 0.37 0.31
(0.82) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67)
WTO membership time
4.55 5.07* 5.13* 5.18*
(3.83) (3.60) (3.62) (3.64)
Importance of agro-food export
sector
1.34 0.67 0.65 0.62
(1.50) (1.22) (1.23) (1.23)
Mean of absolute deviations 1.13 1.09 1.11 1.06
Fraction of exact predictions 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.53
Significance level for likelihood
ratio test on model specification 1% 1% 1% 1%
Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
Number of observations: 53
* significant at the 10% level,
** significant at the 5% level
*** significant at the 1% level
Source: Own compilation.
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The probability to complain per export flow covers a wide range: For the
specification without threshold the highest probability is 489 times, for the
highest threshold it is 589 times the lowest probability. However, Member’s
activity in dispute initiation cannot be inferred from its probability to complain
without considering the number of its export flows: Being one of the two most
active users of the system, the probability to complain for the EC falls into the
lower third whereas the probability of Australia, Canada and the U.S. belong to
the highest for all thresholds. For the $500K threshold the probability of the U.S.
constitutes 3.77 times the EC’s probability. Corresponding to their reciprocal ratio
with respect to their bilateral export flows (1: 28) this results in 31 predicted
disputes for the U.S. (but 34 actually observed) and 30 for the EC (only 24
actually observed).
The likelihood ratio test proves a significant amendment of the model based
on the incorporation of the addressed determinants. For all thresholds the
concerned variables’ contribution could be substantiated at a 1% level.
The findings of HORN ET AL. (1999) on a significant influence of Legal
capacity could not be supported in our analysis of food related disputes. The
variable is selected for the lowest threshold but does not survive the significance
test. This may be explained by the fact that legal capacity increasingly becomes
an internationally tradable good such that each Member can purchase legal
expertise, provided that it has sufficient financial resources. The Advisory Centre
on WTO Law (ACWL)
21
21
The ACWL is a WTO institution supporting developing countries with general legal advice on
WTO matters and was established in 2001 at Geneva. Its “Roster of External Legal Counsel” is
available at: http:// www.acwl.ch/e/tools/news_detailsphoto_e.aspx?id=3c188583-5884-4a1d-ae02-
e65b14370cc9, 15-04-2008.
lists eleven law firms and four individuals on its ‘Roster
of External Legal Counsel’. On the other hand, the finding of BOWN (2005) with
respect to the influence of monetary means is not confirmed by our results either.
Therefore, it seems more likely that legal capacity and monetary means are more
relevant determinants for the overall number of dispute initiations but simply less
important for the variation of probabilities across countries for the smaller food
sector.
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The indicators Influence of private actors and Importance of the agro-food export
sector are selected under all thresholds based on the Akaike information criterion
but their statistically significant influence could not be substantiated.
The indicators on Governmental efficiency and Relevance of the
agricultural sector did also not survive the variable selection process. The latter
might simply be an insufficient proxy for the relevance of a Member’s agro-food-
industry.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper presented an analysis of the determinants for initiating WTO disputes
related to the agro-food sector. Apart from this new sectoral focus, the analysis
extended the literature with a more in-depth analysis of potentially relevant
determinants. The empirical model representing the number of initiated disputes
by country as a sequence of Bernoulli trials – with probabilities modeled by a
logistic distribution – was applied to 53 WTO Member countries.
The results show that some of the determinants relevant in previous dispute
studies such as legal capacity and monetary means could not be confirmed as
statistically relevant in the context of the agro-food sector. It could be shown that
increasing own protectionist attitude lowers the probability to complain and the
level of protection faced by a country leads to an increase as both variables prove
to be statistically significant determinants of dispute initiation in the agro-food
sector. At the same time, the duration of WTO membership clearly contributes to
a larger likelihood to initiate a WTO dispute. Though selected under all thresholds
with their expected sign, the Influence of private actors and the Importance of the
agro-food export sector do not turn out to show a significant influence. This is
also the case for the indicator Legal capacity, that has only been selected under
the model incorporating all export flows.
The outcome on endured and imposed protectionism shows that trade
restrictive policy measures and the willingness to fight for market liberalization
are important drivers in WTO disputes which is intended by the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. The variables Legal capacity and Influence of private
actors are selected with their expected sign but the hypothesis of no statistical
influence could not be rejected. From the validation of Legal capacity would
follow that there are resource constraints in WTO disputes and that reform
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approaches should consider for strengthening developing country Members in the
process of preparing and pursuing disputes, e.g. by means of the ACWL
institution. A validation of the Influence of private actors would suggest to
promote proposals of encouraging Members’ private sector in providing dispute
settlement related legal assistance, as analyzed by BOWN ANDHOEKMAN (2005).
Further research should focus on the improvement of data quality to
validate or disprove the findings on insignificant influences of some variables, for
example the importance of the agro-food sector for the country considered. A
generalization of the model allowing to simultaneously incorporating
characteristics of the defendant country would also be very useful. Currently, the
implied assumption that probabilities to be a defendant are equal across all
countries could only be partially mitigated by including the determinant Endured
protectionism of the complaining country.
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3 Determinants of Bilateral Food Related Disputes
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Abstract
This paper analyses relevant determinants for the probability to initiate a
dispute on policy measures under the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). The empirical analysis focuses on
agro-food related disputes to provide sector specific information on the driving
factors in dispute settlement, and complements and extends previous studies by
incorporating new potential determinants. The focus is shifted to bilaterally
dependent characteristics to take care of trade related and power based
relationships between Members, such as relevance of the defendant’s market
and the complainant’s trade related retaliation capacity. Contrary to recent
analyses of overall trade disputes, the results show that capacity-related
determinants such as financial means and legal capacity and simple trade-
related characteristics like export and import volume do not show a statistically
significant impact on dispute initiation in the agro-food sector. However, the
level of protectionism that Members face in their export markets, their
operating experience with the DSM, the influence of private sector interests,
complainants’ agro-food related export dependency as well as the size of their
agro-food imports from the defendant party could be identified as relevant
determinants of dispute initiation behavior.
Key words: WTO dispute, Agro-food sector, Binary choice model, Weighted
Endogenous Sampling Maximum Likelihood (WESML) estimator
JEL Classification: C12, C13, C25, Q17, Q18
3.1 Introduction
Negotiations on improvements of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM)
are going on since 1997, but seem far from completion. The major objectives are
to make the system more effective and to allow equal access to all different types
of Members. The system’s Member-driven nature determines the conditions of its
use, i.e. it creates incentives that are both market driven and related to Members’
resource endowments and constraints. This investigation aims at identifying
relevant countries’ characteristics having an impact on the probability to observe
a bilateral dispute between them. Information on the factors explaining Members’
22
This chapter was published as GÖTZ C. AND T. HECKELEI (2011): Determinants of Bilateral Food
Related Disputes, Discussion Paper Series, No. 3/2011, Institute for Food and Resource Economics,
Bonn.
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involvement in or absence from the system could help rationalizing the reform
discussion. The empirical analysis focuses on agro-food-related disputes to
provide sector-specific information on the driving factors in dispute settlement.
This paper builds upon GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) shifting the focus to bilaterally
relevant issues in disputes. Previous empirical studies are complemented by
incorporating new potential trade-related determinants and bilaterally dependent
market and power based relationships.
This paper is organized as follows: After depicting the motivation for the
shift to a purely bilateral approach with reference to previous empirical findings,
the model specification and estimation approach are described. This is followed
by a brief description of the unilateral variables used in GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) and
the discussion of the newly introduced bilateral determinants. Statistical
implementation and estimation results are subsequently presented before
concluding.
3.2 Motivation for a bilateral approach
Like most empirical studies on the subject GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) have taken a non-
bilateral approach and thereby mainly addressed capacity and aggregate sector
related characteristics of Members that are likely to come into play in a WTO
dispute. Capacity related determinants are unilateral in nature, like Members’
endowment with financial means, legal capacity, administrative power and
operating experience with the system. They play a major role in the pre-litigation
phase for monitoring trade issues, gathering information and communication with
the private sector and during the course of a panel process to prepare a strong case
and to effectively engage in the panel procedure.
Their influence on Members’ use of the system and also their success in
disputes has been stressed and substantiated by several empirical studies. The
positive influence of Members’ financial means in terms of GDP has been show
by BOWN (2005a) and DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009). BESSON AND MEHDI (2004)
have demonstrated that legal capacity measured as their delegation size in Geneva
increases countries’ likelihood of success in disputes. GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) and
DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) have provided empirical evidence on the positive
influence of Members’ operating experience with the system on their probability
to file disputes. The relevance of Members’ experience with democratic
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governance has been emphasized and supported by BUSCH (2000), BUSCH AND
REINHARDT (2000) and DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009). It can be interpreted as their
general ability to effectively use legalized and rules-based systems like the DSM.
However, it is at the compliance stage after a successful panel ruling where
bilaterally dependent issues play a major role for enforcement. The importance of
the complainant party’s trade-related retaliatory capacity has been emphasized
and its positive influence been substantiated by several studies (see e.g. BOWN
2005a, 2005b, and BUSCH AND REINHARDT 2000). Also, political economy
linkages between complainant and defendant like preferential trade access and
bilateral economic aid may show an effect on Members’ initiation decision. This
has been supported by BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) for countries’ success in
litigation and by BOWN (2005a) for their decision to engage as co-complainants or
interested third party in disputes. In addition, it is worthwhile to complement
aggregate market-related interests with more specific information connected to
the trade relationship between the parties to the dispute. In this context, BOWN
(2005a) has demonstrated that the size of affected exports and the defendant
market’s export relevance to the complainant influence its decision to file a
dispute.
Such bilateral attributes reflect the characteristics of the trade relationship
and economic linkages between the parties. For instance, Members’ retaliatory
capacity is not a general feature in the DSM context but dependent on their
relevance as trade partner for individual defendants. The merits of a bilateral
analysis are also evident in respect of characteristics of the affected sector or
market. Sector related trade between complainant and defendant may reveal
information on the trade issue that cannot be captured by unilateral indicators. In
general, more selective indicators allow for a more precise assessment of
influences.
3.3 A bilaterally dependent dispute initiation model and
estimation approach
This analysis is based on the model developed by HORN ET AL. (1999) and applied
by GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) to agro-food trade disputes. It is modified here to capture
also characteristics that differ for each bilateral trade relationship. The dispute
initiation decision is described through a binary choice model in which a
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Member’s probability to complain against another Member depends on a set of
the complainant’s traits or the characteristics of its specific environment and on
the trade-related and power-based relationship between complainant and
defendant. The implicated conditional probability function for this binary choice
situation is the Bernoulli distribution
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where
ijo
y
is the binary dependent variable which takes 1 for a complaint and 0
for no complaint,
i
and
j
indicate the complainant and the defendant respectively
and o refers to the observation, i.e. a certain dispute initiation decision,
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x
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vector of K determinants and
β
denotes the vector of K corresponding
coefficients. Function
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calculates the individual probability to complain
for a potential complainant
i
against a potential defendant
j
which can be
represented by any cumulative probability distribution function. Here, we use the
widely employed conditional logistic distribution,
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resulting in the bilaterally dependent Logit model of agro-food related dispute
initiations. Note that equations (3.1) and (3.2) are the same as the first two
equations in Götz et al. 2010 except that variables and probabilities are double
indexed by
i
and j and not only by
i
.
Observations or binary choice situations are defined as bilateral agro-food
related trade flows from the potential complainant to the potential defendant
Member. The proceeding for the assessment of determinants is the reproduction
of the observed sample of dispute initiations over the period from January 1, 1995
to December 31, 2005. Due to the limited number of disputes in bilateral
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relationships, efficient estimation requires application of the weighted
endogenous sampling maximum likelihood estimator developed by MANSKI and
LERMAN (1977). Observations with
1y =
were oversampled to enrich the skewed
original sample. The resulting sample selection bias is then mitigated in the
estimation process by weighting the likelihood contributions based on their
proportion in the enriched sample in relation to their true proportion in the
population. Under the assumption of independent and identically distributed
observations the log-likelihood function is given as
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is the number of bilateral agro-food related
observations for the bilateral relationship between Member
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j
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The expected number of Member complaints against Member
j
is
then given by the expected value of the sample of observations,
( ) ( )
ij ij ij ij
E c n π= xβ
,
(2.14)
which is strictly proportional to the number of observed bilateral trade flows
ij
n .
Similarly to the non-bilateral case in GÖTZ ET AL. (2010), the number of
independent Bernoulli trials for each Member combination requires information
about the exact number of infringements that each Member faces in its trade
relationship with potential defendants, as the aforementioned binary choice model
refers to the litigation decision when WTO obligations are violated. Since we
have no a priori information about the existence of inconsistent trade measures,
'i s
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the analysis is based on the assumption that they are uniformly distributed across
export flows. We cannot separately identify the determinants for the incidence of
trade infringements and their influence on Members’ probability to file disputes.
Following GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) we mitigate the problem of missing information
about the distribution of infringements by incorporating the indicators Endured
protectionism and Own imposed protectionism. Likewise, the compilation of
bilateral export flows between Member combinations is due to a value threshold
defined by empirical estimates of induced litigation costs. The number of
independent Bernoulli trials
ij
n is then defined as the yearly average of different
agro-food related export flows over the investigation period sent from the
complainant’s to the defendant’s market.
3.4 Determinants considered
Deviating from most existing studies but similar to GÖTZ ET AL. (2010), this paper
focuses specifically on agricultural and food-related disputes. This sector focused
approach provides the basis for testing more precise hypotheses and especially the
newly introduced bilaterally dependent determinants are sector specific. Due to
limited data availability for some determinants under investigation the sample is
limited to 53 Members while maintaining the distribution over income classes
according to The World Bank atlas method
23
Differing from GÖTZ ET AL. (2010), the data on disputes, on trade flows
and on all trade related indicators (Agro-food export value, Agro-food import
value, Agro-food export dependency from defendant, Agro-food import
dependency from defendant and Agro-food related trade retaliatory capacity) are
varying with the bilateral relationship considered.
.
Table 3.1 provides an overview on all explanatory variables grouped as
unilaterally and bilaterally dependent with their respective data source and
expected impact on the initiation of disputes. The unilateral control variables have
23
Income classes are: low income, $1,005 or less; lower middle income, $1,006 - $3,975; upper
middle income, $3,976 - $12,275; and high income, $12,276 or more. Available online at:
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications, 2011-10-04.
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already been incorporated in GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) and the bilateral control
variables are newly introduced.
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Table 3.1: Survey on explanatory variables, data and expected sign
Type of
variable
Explanatory variables Data Source
Expected
sign
Unilateral
control
variables
Endured
protectionism
Average endured tariff
equivalent
Kee, Nicita,
Olarreaga (2006)
+
Own imposed
protectionism
Average imposed tariff
equivalent
Kee, Nicita,
Olarreaga (2006)
-
Legal capacity Size of permanent
delegation at Geneva
United Nations
(2004)
+
Capacity to absorb
legal costs/wealth
Gross Domestic Product
(GDP)
World Bank
(2007)
+
Governmental
efficiency
Measure of effectiveness
and integrity of the legal
and judicial system
Kaufmann (2004)
+
Influence of private
actors
Measure of legal
dimensions of undue
political influence by the
private sector
Kaufmann (2004)
+
Importance of agro-
food sector
Share of agro-food related
export value in GDP
Word Bank
(2007)
+
WTO membership
time
Index based on a member's
percentage membership
time over investigation
period
World Trade
Organization
(2007)
+
Bilateral
control
variables
Agro-food export
value
Complainant's total agro-
food export value to
defendant
EuroCare (2006)
+
Agro-food import
value
Complainant's total agro-
food import value from
defendant
EuroCare (2006)
-/+
Agro-food export
dependency from
defendant
Share of complainant's
agro-food export value to
defendant in complainant's
total agro-food exports
EuroCare (2006)
+
Agro-food import
dependency from
defendant
Share of complainant's
agro-food imports from
defendant in complainant's
total agro-food imports
EuroCare (2006)
-/+
Agro-food trade
retaliatory capacity
Share of defendant's agro-
food exports to complainant
in defendant's total agro-
food exports
EuroCare (2006)
+
Source: Own compilation
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3.4.1.Unilateral variables
It follows a condensed description of the unilateral variables and related data that
are taken from GÖTZ ET AL. (2010). The set of unilateral country characteristics is
reflected by Induced costs of litigation, Members’ Legal capacity, their Capacity
to absorb litigation costs/wealth, Governmental efficiency, the Influence of
private actors, the Importance of the agro-food sector, their Endured
protectionism and Own imposed protectionism, and their WTO membership time.
For their motivation and related hypotheses please see GÖTZ ET AL. (2010).
Induced costs of litigation
To account for Induced costs of litigation, bilateral trade flows between Member
combinations are compiled based on value thresholds. Following GÖTZ ET AL.
(2010) export flows are counted based on average litigation costs of WTO cases
of different complexity as calculated by NORDSTRÖM (2005). Likewise, the
analysis is conducted for four different litigation cost levels, i.e. excluding all
flows below the respective threshold: $0 when no threshold is applied, $300K for
low costs, $500K for medium costs and $700K for high litigation costs. The
rationale behind this is to account for fixed costs of litigation. Put differently, it is
hypothesized that trade flows have to exceed a certain threshold to be considered
worth enough to justify costly WTO adjudication.
Legal capacity
As in GÖTZ ET AL. (2010), Members’ size of standing delegation in Geneva in
2004 is used as proxy for their overall Legal capacity connected to WTO
adjudication. Legal capacity is required to effectively participate in the panel
procedure and for countries’ general ability to process trade issues under the
WTO. The data stems from UNITEDNATIONS (2004).
Capacity to absorb litigation costs/wealth
As proxy for Members’ Capacity to absorb litigation costs/wealth their GDP in
US-Dollars, provided by the WORLD BANK (2007) is used. It may be interpreted
as substitutive factor for Legal capacity and also as a measure of Members’
overall freedom to engage in their trade issues. The indicator is an average of
Members’ yearly reported GDP over the investigation period.
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Governmental efficiency and Influence of private actors
To account for Members’ Governmental efficiency related to processing WTO
trade issues the ‘Judicial/Legal Effectiveness Integrity Index (JLEI)’ is
incorporated. It assesses the effectiveness and integrity of countries’ legal and
judicial system. It may be interpreted as the processing ability of their
administrative structures that play an important role especially at the pre-litigation
phase of disputes for gathering and exploitation of information on trade issues and
communication with the private sector.
The Influence of private actors on governmental decisions in the DSM
context is measured by the ‘Corporate Legal Corruption Component (CLCC)’,
measuring legal dimensions of undue political influence by the private sector. It
provides information on the private sector’s ability to communicate its interests
and petition the government, which is important as only governments have legal
standing at the WTO. Both indicators are provided by KAUFMANN (2004).
Importance of the agro-food sector
The Importance of the agro-food sector for their economies is measured as the
share of Members’ agro-food related export value in their GDP. The data comes
from the WORLD BANK (2007). The indicator represents an average over the
investigation period.
Endured protectionism and Own imposed protectionism
Members’ faced level of protectionism is measured by the Market Access Overall
Trade Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI) provided by KEE ET AL. (2006). It
comprises a tariff equivalent of all barriers in the agro-food sector that exporters
of the respective country face on average across trade partners and commodities.
The indicator refers to data stemming from 1995-1998 concerning the non-tariff
component and from 2000-2004 for the tariff component of the aggregated MA-
OTRI.
The indicator on Members’ Own imposed protectionism is intended to
capture aspects of strategic behavior in the DSM context and to account for
Members’ overall inclination towards the WTO’s objective of free trade. It is a
tariff equivalent of all trade barriers in the agro-food sector which the respective
country imposes in average upon the rest of the world. It provides the mirror
image of the aforementioned MA-OTRI indicator, measuring the trade
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restrictiveness from the potential complainant’s perspective and refers to the same
period of measurement.
WTOmembership time
To account for Members’ operating experience with the DSM, the approach of
GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) is followed by creating an index over the time since the
inception of the organization until the end of the investigation period, relating
each Member’s membership time to the whole observation period. The associated
data is from WTO (2007).
3.4.2. Bilateral variables
In the following the compilation of disputes, of trade flows and the newly
introduced bilaterally dependent characteristics are motivated and described
together with the data used. Disputes are the dependent variable in the estimation.
Bilateral trade flows are not control variables but the foundation of the binary
choice model, i.e. the observations or the binary choice situations. Data on
bilateral trade flows come from EUROCARE (2006) available at HS-4-level. In
contrast to GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) trade flows are purely bilateral, i.e. refer to the
trade relationship between potential complainant and defendant Member.
Disputes data
Dispute initiations were collected that affected products of the agricultural and
food sector. The investigation period is from January 1, 1995, to December 31,
2005, thereby slightly shortened compared to GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) to make the
compilation of disputes consistent with the data on trade. The modus operandi for
counting disputes is identical to GÖTZ ET AL. (2010): initiations are counted once
excluding re-uptakes of disputes, jointly filed initiations are assigned each
participant, filings on the same trade issue but with different Members are
separately counted and for disputes of as well as against European Community
(EC) Members there is one dispute assigned the EC, as complainant in the first
and as defendant in the latter case. The data on disputes stem fromWTO (2011).
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Agro-food related trade retaliatory capacity
Members’ trade retaliatory power is seen as especially relevant for the compliance
phase after a pro-complainant ruling by the panel or Appellate body. The self-
enforcing nature of the DSM charges the complainant with the enforcement of
compliance. If the defendant refuses to bring its trade regime into account with its
WTO obligations, the complainant party may be entitled to impose penalty tariffs
on imports from the defendant party. Although retaliation may also be entitled
under other agreements the level of imports in the affected sector is supposed to
reveal information about the complainant’s overall trade retaliation capacity.
However, this retaliatory threat is only credible if the defendant’s exports to the
complainant’s market accounts for a substantial amount in its total exports. The
complainant’s trade retaliatory power is measured as the defendant’s share of
agro-food export value to the complainant in the defendant’s total agro-food
export value. The data on trade flows and value come from EUROCARE (2006).
Agro-food export value to defendant
To complement the unilateral indicator Importance of the agro-food sector
Members’ aggregate agro-food related exports to the defendants’ market is
incorporated. The indicator provides an average over the investigation period. It is
assumed that the overall export value provides information on the relevance of
agro-food trade of the respective trade relationship between complainant and
defendant. Hence, the aggregate export value is supposed to show a positive
impact on complainant parties’ dispute initiation probability. The data on
Members’ trade volume is from EUROCARE (2006).
Agro-food import value from defendant
The volume of imports from the potential defendant’s market may reflect two
different aspects of the relationship between complainant and defendant. First, the
larger the volume of trade sent from the defendant to the complainant’s market,
the higher may the complainant’s opportunities for trade retaliation be with
respect to the defendant’s market. Second, the volume of imports may be
interpreted to incorporate information about intra-industry trade or agro-food
products for consumption. A high volume of trade sent from the defendant to the
complainant may thereby be associated with a dependency of the complainant’s
on the defendant’s market, either for its industry or its domestic consumption.
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This makes effective retaliation through penalty tariffs less likely. Hence, the
complainant’s import value may show a positive or a negative influence. The
indicator is compiled as an average over the investigation period and the data is
taken from EUROCARE (2006).
Export dependency and Import dependency from defendant
Both indicators show the defendant’s relevance as trade partner. A complainant
party’s agro-food export sector might be more or less dependent on the defendant
party’s market. It is hypothesized that Members’ export sector is more dependent
on the defendant’s market, the more they export to this market in relation to their
overall agro-food exports. Hence, Members’ stronger Export dependency on
certain trade partners is assumed to show a positive influence on their probability
to complain against those partners.
Members’ Import dependency might show a positive or a negative
influence. The more they import from certain partners relative to their overall
imports the more dependent their import sector from those partners. This Import
dependency might have a negative impact on their ability to impose retaliation
measures against those partners for the reason that they just cannot afford to cut
off the affected imports. From this follows that Import dependency might show a
negative impact on their decision to initiate disputes against their respective
partners because their dependency makes potential retaliation measures and
thereby also the successful accomplishment of the dispute unlikely. On the other
hand a high Import dependency may imply a substantial amount of imports from
the respective defendant, suggesting a high retaliation capacity. Hence, the
indicator on Import dependency might capture the aspect of trade retaliatory
power and thereby could show a positive influence on Members’ probability to
complain against the respective partners.
Export dependency is measured as the share of complainants’ agro-food
export value to the defendant’s market in complainants’ overall agro-food export
value. Members’ Import dependency is measured as the share of complainants’
agro-food import value from the defendant’s market in complainants’ overall
agro-food import value. The data on trade flows and values stem from EUROCARE
(2006).
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3.5 Statistical Implementation and Results
The selection of relevant variables is based on the Akaike information criterion.
This procedure trades off the inclusion of additional variables against the
increased fit of the model. Incorporating additional explanatory variables
improves the goodness of fit regardless of the number of free parameters in the
data generating process. The increased complexity is penalized by the Akaike
indicator thereby mitigating the danger of over-fitting. The preferred model
specification is that one showing the lowest information criterion value. All
different model specifications are evaluated, i.e. all specifications are estimated
and their corresponding information criterion value calculated. A test on joint
significant influence is conducted for the best specification under each value
threshold on export flows, i.e. that one yielding the lowest information criterion
value. Variables’ joint significant influence is verified by an asymptotic
significance test based on the bootstrapped sampling distribution of the estimator
(see EFRON AND TIBSHIRANI 1994). The quality of the model is further on
validated by a likelihood ratio test. In this process the logarithmic likelihood
function value of the unconstrained ML estimator

β , is compared with the log-
likelihood function value of the constrained ML estimator

β
, which is obtained
by maximizing the logarithmic likelihood function subject to the linear
restrictions

0 0
k
k= ∀ ≠β . The LR test statistic is computed as

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
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ij ij ij ij ij
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β x β
,
(2.15)
which has a Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of imposed restrictions.
24
24
Estimation, selection of variables, the likelihood ratio test and the testing procedure are
implemented in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System), see BROOKE, A., KENDRICK, D.,
MEERAUS, A. AND R. RAMAN (1998): GAMS - A User's Guide, Washington, D.C. Standard
errors of the coefficients are calculated for 2000 re-sampling iterations. The bootstrap re-sampling
procedure is conducted in GAUSS
TM
, see http://www.aptech.com/, 2011-04-17.
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According to this proceeding six of the considered determinants are
retained in the final specifications: (1) Endured protectionism, (2) Own imposed
protectionism, (3) Influence of private actors, (4) WTO membership time,
(5) Agro-food import value, and (6) Agro-food export dependency from defendant
result in a sufficient increase in the goodness of fit. However, their selection
changes dependent on the imposed threshold. For the application of the $0
threshold the (3) Influence of private actors, (4) Operating experience, (5) Agro-
food import value, and (6) Agro-food export dependency are selected, under the
$500K and the $700K thresholds the (3) Influence of private actors, and (6) Agro-
food export dependency, and for the $300K threshold Members’ (2) Own imposed
protectionism are additionally discarded in the variable selection process. The (3)
Influence of private actors is only selected when no threshold on export flows is
applied in their compilation. Table 3.2 comprises the results for the selected
specifications of the unrestricted model subject to different thresholds on export
flows. The standard errors are given in brackets behind the respective coefficients.
All variables show their expected sign and except for the variable (2) Own
imposed protectionism are shown to be statistically significant. The indicator (5)
Agro-food import value turned out to show a positive impact on Members’
likelihood to file cases, as expected under the trade retaliation related hypothesis.
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Table 3.2: Results for specification selections subject to different thresholds on
export flows
Threshold on export value
Exploratory variables $0 $300K $500K $700K
BETA 0 -14,025 -12,078 -11,811 -11,643
Endured protectionism
not
included
2.150***
(0.89)
2.196***
(0.92)
2.269***
(0.87)
Own imposed
protectionism
not
included
not
included
- 0.516
(0.66)
- 0.511
(0.66)
Influence of private
actors
0.734***
(0.31)
not
included
not
included
not
included
WTO membership time
3.923*
(2.67)
3.754*
(2.47)
3.887**
(2.09)
3.864**
(2.31)
Agro-food Export
dependency
0.972**
(0.47)
not
included
not
included
not
included
Agro-food import value
from defendant
2.652***
(0.21)
1.384***
(0.33)
1.108***
(0.30)
0.981***
(0.35)
* Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level
Level of significance for Likelihood ratio test on model specification: 1% under all thresholds.
Source: Own compilation.
The likelihood ratio test proves a significant amendment of the model based on
the incorporation of the addressed determinants. For all thresholds the concerned
variables’ joint contribution could be substantiated at the 1% level.
As hypothesized Members facing higher levels of protectionism in their agro-food
trade relations show a higher probability to file agro-food related disputes. This is
in accord with the objectives of the system where we would expect that more
protectionist policy measures are likely to trigger arbitration about them.
Demonstrated as relevant influence in the empirical study of GÖTZ ET AL. (2010)
and even though selected with the hypothesized sign the impact of Members’ own
tendency towards protectionist policies could not be substantiated in this bilateral
context.
Supporting the arguments of SHAFFER (2003a, 2003b) and HOEKMAN AND
MAVROIDIS (2000) on the relevance of private lobbying activities during the pre-
litigation stage, the influencing power of private sector interest is demonstrated.
However, the respective control variable is only included under the lowest
threshold. This suggests that when higher valued trade stakes are involved
lobbying activities are of minor relevance in governments’ decisions on
adjudication. Put differently, lower expected gains from disputed trade may
require higher lobbying efforts to prompt governments to pursue a costly WTO
dispute.
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Confirming the findings of DAVIS and BERMEO (2009) and GÖTZ ET AL.
(2010), Members’ operating experience clearly shows a significant impact under
all thresholds on export value. This may be due to its fixed cost decreasing
influence as emphasized by DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) and GÖTZ ET AL. (2010)
and increased efficiency in processing disputes through learning.
Members’ Agro-food export dependency has a significant positive impact,
confirming the relevance of the trade relationship with the defendant, i.e. the
relevance of the disputed market in the decision to file a case. Although the more
selective indicator on Agro-food related trade retaliation capacity does not turn
out to show an influence on variation in disputes, Members’ Agro-food import
value from the defendant is selected with positive sign under all thresholds and
significant. Hence, the higher volume of trade that goes to complainants’ markets
from defendants is not decisively reflected in their overall agro-food related
importance to defendants. However, the positive influence of the absolute market-
related import value may imply that Members have the potential to impose a
critical damage to the defendant’s market. On the other hand, Members’ import
value might be connected to the issue of import-competition. In this case the
indicator may reflect the value of prospective gains for domestic import-
competing firms suggesting an incentive for related disputes. However, a more
precise assessment of this potential issue would require a more detailed and case
study based analysis incorporating information on the subject of the dispute and
on affected firms and trade flows.
The Importance of Members’ agro-food export sector could not be
supported. This may reflect that agro-food exports play a minor role in the
economy of the most active users of the system, e.g. the U.S. and the EC. As in
GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) the influence of Members’ Capacity to absorb legal
costs/wealth and their Governmental efficiency could not be substantiated. Also,
their Agro-food export value to and their Agro-food import dependency from the
defendant could not been demonstrated to show an influence.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper presented an analysis of the determinants for initiating WTO disputes
related to the agro-food sector. The investigation built upon on the analysis of
GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) but shifted the focus to bilaterally dependent Member
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characteristics that are connected to their trade relationships. Bilateral indicators
reflect Members’ relevance as trade partner to each other and are especially
relevant for enforcement of compliance, like the complainant’s trade related
retaliatory capacity and its dependency on the defendant’s market. Unilateral
characteristics taken from GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) were also tested. The empirical
model representing Members dispute initiation decision as Bernoulli trials – with
probabilities modeled by a logistic distribution – was applied to 53 WTO Member
countries. The bilateral approach involved an estimation problem related to a
skewed sample in terms of few bilateral WTO disputes in contrast to the huge
number of trade flows as observations. To allow for an efficient estimation the
Weighted Endogenous Sampling Maximum Likelihood (WESML) estimator
developed by MANSKI AND LERMAN (1977) was applied.
The results show that some of the determinants relevant in previous dispute
studies such as financial means and legal capacity could not be confirmed as
statistically relevant in the context of the agro-food sector. Also, the influence of
simple trade related characteristics like export and import value in the sector
could not be substantiated. It could be shown that the level of faced protectionism,
the relevance of private sector influences in their economy, and their operating
experience with the DSM significantly increase Members’ likelihood to file
complaints. Regarding bilaterally dependent trade characteristics, the positive
impact of Members’ Agro-food export dependency and their Agro-food import
value from the defendant on their initiation probability is empirically supported.
Their influence can be motivated as showing the defendant’s relevance as trade
partner for the complainant and the complaint’s capacity to threaten retaliation
with respect to the defendant’s market, respectively.
Further research should focus on the improvement of data quality to
validate or disprove the findings on insignificant influences of some variables, for
example on Members’ overall dispute processing and administrative capacity. A
more selective measurement of Members’ trade related retaliatory capacity, which
is relevant for enforcement, might contribute to a better understanding of this
issue in trade disputes.
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4 The drivers of dispute initiation under the World
Trade Organization
4.1 Introduction
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is the central device to resolve trade
issues between Members related to their multilateral agreements under the World
Trade Organization (WTO). The arbitration and enforcement of WTO law is not
hierarchical but Member-driven in nature. This implies that all stages and actions
of a dispute, starting from the request for bilateral consultations over panel
proceedings up to the enforcement of panel and Appellate Body rulings are based
on the initiative of the parties to the dispute. From this follows that two major
factors influence Members’ decision about filing of and their performance in
WTO disputes. First, disputes are based on economic incentives of the
adjudicated trade issue, i.e. expected gains from disputed trade and related costs,
and, second, Members’ endowment with resources and the characteristics of their
economic environment and political economic relationship with each other.
Several empirical papers have focused on the DSM in order to identify the
determinants of its use. This chapter aims at integrating their findings into an
extensive theoretical framework for the use of the DSM in view of its economic
incentives. The focus is laid on Members’ decision about filing a dispute.
The procedure of the chapter is to set up an economic model in order to
demonstrate the underlying rationales for initiating WTO disputes together with
the related major influencing factors at the different stages of disputes. The first
part of the chapter is along the line of a cost benefit analysis. We start from a
simple rationale where we assume that the gains from disputed trade are traded-
off against related litigation costs. This trade and litigation cost model is then
stepwise refined by extending it to further aspects of disputes, specifically
uncertainty issues and Members’ political and economic linkages. Hypotheses
about the economic rationales that lead to the establishment of the model and the
relevant influencing factors are motivated both by the discussion of empirical
findings as well as economic theory, where determinants are content-wise
grouped under sections. This cost-benefit analysis is then complemented by the
second part of the paper stressing issues of the pre-litigation phase of disputes,
especially the private sector role and political economy drivers.
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The structure of the chapter is as follows: The first part discusses the determinants
of the assumed cost-benefit analysis behind disputes and comprises (1)
complainant’s trade objective and related direct costs, the (2) potential indirect
costs of dispute initiation that might occur due to political and economic linkages
with trade partners, and the (3) problem of uncertainty of a successful resolution
of the issue. This is complemented by the second part on aspects of the pre-
litigation phase and the political economy process behind disputes before
concluding.
Table 4.1 provides a survey on the empirical studies cited in this chapter. It
comprises information on their investigation period, dispute coverage, and
research question, used model and incorporated determinants. Table 4.2 depicts
their findings referring to the issue of the analysis and grouped according to the
sections of this chapter.
4.2 Determinants of the economic initiation condition
4.2.1. Trade objective and related direct costs
The primary objective of filing a dispute is improved access to the respondent’s
market. Trade disputes may target protective policy measures that directly
decrease the complainant’s market access through tariffs or non-tariff policies like
SPS-measures or trade remedies or they may relate to measures that indirectly
harm the complainant’s market through subsidies, the discrimination between
products from different sources or by non-compliance with the provisions on
intellectual property rights.
25
Filing a dispute is rational from the constrained trade related cost-benefit
perspective, it the net present value of the dispute is positive, i.e. if the present
value of the gains from expanding trade exceeds the direct costs of the dispute
In either case the complainant’s export opportunities
are impaired through the deterrence from the market or through distortion of
competition.
25
Trade remedies refer to measures under the Antidumping agreement, the Countervailing duties
agreement and the Safeguards provisions.
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(see BOWN AND HOEKMAN 2005).
26
i
Direct costs include all necessary
expenditures that are associated with preparing and pursuing the case, namely pre-
trial costs stemming from gathering information, communication with affected
export- and import-competing firms, preparing the case, conducting bilateral
consultations and preparing submissions and panel hearings. Formally, Member
’s decision to file a dispute is rational, if
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are the costs that are associated with the formal WTO
dispute settlement process as well as with the phase of preparing the dispute and
possible informal bilateral consultations. Direct costs are associated with the
affected market k as they might differ dependent on the trade issue’s
characteristics.
T
denotes the planning horizon, i.e. a reasonable number of
periods considered as relevant for the government’s calculations.
A finite planning horizon seems to be more realistic in this cost-benefit
calculation than an infinite time horizon. As the described cost-benefit calculation
refers to the allocation of scarce resources, i.e. administrative and monetary
capacities raising costs almost instantly compared to the uncertain pay-offs, it is
reasonable to assume that gains of the remote future do not come into play, since
such pay-offs would be rather dependent on unforeseeable influences on
production and market developments than on today’s decision about initiating the
dispute. Direct costs occur with government’s decision to accept the case for
consultation under the WTO. After the government was informed about a trade
infringement – whether by affected private sector firms or by its trade monitoring
agencies – it has to decide to further pursue or to discard the case. Hence, for
simplicity all costs gathered in
D
ijk
C can be assigned the time of the government’s
26
BOWN ANDHOEKMAN 2005 start from this simple model to discuss proposals that could reduce the
size of litigation costs for poor country complainants and the uncertainty about the size of those
costs and of potential market access benefits.
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acceptation decision, whereas gains from expanded exports are assumed to occur
later.
27
Both for tariff as well as for non-tariff measures the benefit from expanded
trade through removing the trade barrier is supposed to be positively related to the
value of affected exports. As non-tariff policies like SPS-measures may lead to a
cut of the affected exports up to their total amount the potential export gain is
increasingly related to
( )
0
t
ijk
∏
. Likewise, a percentage cut of exports through
tariff measures is non-decreasingly related to the maximal trade value in the
absence of the trade barrier.
Future gains from expanded trade are weighed with discount factor
i
δ
. The
lower the government’s discount factor, i.e. the more present-oriented the
complainant, the larger the weight of the liberalization outcome in the calculation,
i.e. the higher trade gains must be to fulfill equation 1. Differences in planning
horizon and discount factor may reflect characteristics of trade issues and
capacities of Members. First, this may reflect the difference between
governments’ general strategies for the enforcement of their trade opportunities
under the WTO and long-term trade interest on the one hand and short-run
market-opening concerns of private firms on the other hand that come onto the
government’s agenda through private lobbying activities. A larger planning
horizon T
together with a low discount factor then reflects a more strategic and
future-oriented trade policy. Second, planning horizon and discount factor may
reflect capacity constraints of the Member. If a Member has a larger planning
horizon and high discount factor current direct costs then carry a lower weight in
the calculation. Put differently, the complainant has more means and freedom in
terms of resources and can afford to enter disputes even if the invested resources
would pay off only in the longer run.
27
If the parties to the dispute reach a mutually agreed solution in their bilateral consultations leading
to a removal of the infringement, the gains from expanded trade may occur after several months,
depending on the respondent’s ability to restructure its trade regime quickly. However, if the dispute
takes the full length of the settlement procedure a final ruling is due with the Appellate Body’s
ruling after 18 months according to the WTO provisions. If the final ruling is in favor of the
complainant the respondent is required to comply with the violated agreements during the course of
an arbitrated ‘reasonable period of time’. Hence, even in the case where the respondent is willing to
comply with the ruling, a time span of two to three years until the expected trade gains occur is not
very unlikely.
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The positive influence of trade stakes, i.e. of the dependence on the affected
export market and of the costs of litigation on the decision for filing a dispute is
substantiated by the literature. According to REINHARDT (2000) “Increasing
dependence on foreign trade raises the stakes in leveling the playing field, which
motivates states to lodge disputes against their partners”. DAVIS AND BERMEO
(2009) identify the stake in liberalization which is dependent on the level of trade
volume as one of the main reasons that justifies investing resources into a trade
dispute. HORN ET AL. (1999) mark the beginning of empirical studies on the use
of the DSU and show by their application of a binomial dispute distribution model
that Members’ overall export value and diversity increases their probability for
dispute initiation.
28
GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) focus on disputes in the agro-food sector and show that
the variation of disputes across Members is partly explained by selecting trade
flows based on a value threshold. They apply three different value thresholds to
count Members’ overall WTO-related bilateral export flows, where the value
thresholds correspond to average litigation costs for cases of different complexity
under the DSU. The application of the lowest threshold improves the model’s
prediction quality, however higher thresholds do not show a considerable effect.
This may suggest that export flows have to exceed a minimum value to make
them relevant for the consideration to dispute, where this minimum threshold
corresponds to average litigation costs for a less complex case under the DSU as
reported by NORDSTRÖM (2005).
For the group of developing countries DAVIS AND BERMEO
(2009) could not confirm a significant impact of trade diversity on their
propensity to initiate disputes. This might suggest that their initiation behavior is
influenced by other characteristics that are opposed to their liberalization interests
in their trade partner’s markets.
29
28
HORN ET AL. (1999): Their model is based on 77 Members‘ total number of different export flows
in all sectors against all other WTO Members in the sample including 155 requests for bilateral
consultations over the period from 1995-01-01 to 1998-21-31. They conclude that the variation in
dispute initiation is to a large extent reflected in Members’ export diversity. As for their sample
export value is strongly correlated with Members’ export diversity (0.64), they argue that both
export diversity as well as export value to a large extent reflect the differences in dispute initiations
over Members.
HOLMES ET AL. (2003) without differentiating
29
NORDSTRÖM (2005): Based on Data stemming from the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL)
he calculates average litigation costs for three scenarios in terms of cases’ complexity. According to
their calculations less complex cases involve about $300K, medium complex cases about $500K
and highly complex cases about $700K. Cost calculations merely incorporate the legal expenses
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between exports and imports show that Members’ number of disputes is highly
correlated with their overall share in world trade
30
Concerning countries’ decision to join filed disputes as co-complainant or
as interested third party BOWN (2005a) provides support for the positive impact of
a country’s volume of exports at stake and BOWN (2005b) demonstrates its
positive impact on the likelihood to complain against United States imposed trade
remedies.
, supporting the findings of
HORN ET AL. (1999) that trade volume and export diversity are closely correlated.
31
REINHARDT (2000) shows that states are more likely to initiate disputes,
and to be targeted as well, when a high proportion of their Gross Domestic
Product derives from imports and exports with the respective partner, i.e. if they
are more dependent on trade with their partner both as exporter and importer.
Focusing on developing countries DAVIS and BERMEO (2009) could not confirm a
significant impact of trade interest measured as overall trade value in GDP and
argue that trade interests may be more useful to explain variation of disputes
between countries with more and less diversified export sectors, but not for the
subset of developing countries.
BOWN (2005a) argues that Members that are more reliant on the
defendant’s market for their exports are more likely to participate in disputes.
Their dependency on the defendant’s market may stem from a market-specific
fixed cost of exporting, e.g. by investments in terms of a sales and logistic
infrastructure. As a consequence, they may be more concerned about their ability
to deflect lost trade to alternative third markets and thereby be more prone to
engage in a dispute on this market. However, BOWN (2005a) could not find
empirical support for this argument.
oriented at legal fees for hired international lawyers that are associated with persecution and do not
involve any other costs related to preparing the case, allocating governmental and administrative
resources or potential political costs that might result from the trial. Information on the ACWL is
available online at http://www.acwl.ch/e/index.html, 2010-11-17.
30
However, they also report a change over time. Over the period 1995-1998 82% of the variation in
disputes is reflected in the variation in trade, this changes to 67% for the period 1999-2002.
Additionally, the high correlation between dispute and trade share is dominated by the EC and the
US, both Members that do not face capacity constraints or potential other impediments that are
discussed under the following paragraphs.
31
BOWN (2005b): Both the size of export value lost through a U.S. trade remedy as well as the size
of the trade remedy itself is identified as relevant determinant of Members’ likelihood to challenge
the respective policy measure.
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From the perspective of litigation costs the selection of trade flows in the
application of the model used by HORN ET AL. (1999) and GÖTZ ET AL. (2010)
reflects the thought that only those trade flows come into consideration to dispute
that are worth enough to bring to trial. The imposition of thresholds for the
compilation of Members’ total number of bilateral export flows accounts for the
idea of fixed costs of litigation. The application of parameterized thresholds of
$1k, $1m, and $10m in HORN ET AL. (1999) results in an increased fit of their
model related to the threshold level, whereas GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) could confirm
an increased fit only for the lowest empirical threshold of $300K, suggesting the
above mentioned condition of a minimum value of export flows for the initiation
decision.
Litigation costs under the DSU are discussed in several studies focusing on
developing countries’ access to the system. DELICH (2002) points out that there is
a common concern among developing countries regarding “the costs associated
with submitting, pursuing, and defending cases developing countries regarding
“the costs associated with submitting, pursuing, and defending cases and the
scarcity of human resources for dealing with increasingly complex issues”.
BUSCH AND REINHARDT (2000) state that the increase in legalization brought by
the WTO DSU considerably raised transaction costs and BUSCH AND REINHARDT
(2003) argue that this increases the burden to use the system especially for poor
countries. Developing and least developed countries (LDC) typically export
commodities with low profit margins and their export sector is characterized by
small and medium size enterprises. This presumably causes their gains from
expanding exports through a trade dispute to be too low to make them worth
enough to fight for, i.e. inequality 4.1 might not be fulfilled for most of their
potentially disputable trade issues.
Contrary to that DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) find that in many potential
WTO disputes, the trade stakes for developing countries are large enough to
engage in a dispute which is on the same line like the finding on the financial
aspect of disputes in a paper submitted by the Mexican delegation to the WTO.
According to WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION – MEXICAN MISSION TO THE WTO
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(2007) the value of disputed trade is likely to outweigh the involved litigation
costs for developing Members’ major trade issues.
32
However, from the fact that the trade stakes are large enough it does not
follow the conclusion that capacity constraints do not play a role. First, gains
through expanded trade lie ahead in the future, are uncertain with respect to a
successful ruling and compliance but resources to process the dispute are needed
at present. Second, governments cannot delegate all tasks to private law firms.
Identifying the violation and assessing whether the expected benefits justify the
involved costs of the dispute has to be accomplished by the government. Hence,
even if the trade stakes are high enough implying that inequality 4.1 is fulfilled
the uncertain expected gains cannot be used to pay for the expenses that are
currently associated with effectively processing the case. GUZMAN AND SIMMONS
(2005) demonstrate that developing countries focus on large markets in choosing
defendants and argue that Members thereby pursue the strategy to allocate their
scarce domestic financial and personnel resources to the highest valued trade
issues.
33
32
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION – MEXICAN MISSION TO THEWTO (2007): Based on calculations of
legal expenses for legal services on an hourly basis provided by the Advisory Centre on WTO Law
(ACWL) and comparing them with the trade stakes for Ecuador in the Bananas Case raised by
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the US against the EU in 1996 they infer that
“financial aspects of engaging in a WTO dispute do not seem to be at the core of the problem.”.
According to their calculations the maximal expenses for ACWL services required for pursuing the
cases equal half-a-day of Ecuador’s losses stemming from the EU trade infringement in its banana
import regime.
A country with less capacity faces higher opportunity costs when it files
a complaint. Put differently, focusing on large markets means minimizing the
opportunity costs of disputes in the presence of scarce resources. This strategy
reflects a prioritization of potential disputable trade issues according to the
underlying rationale formally described in inequality 4.1 and associated with a
ranking of trade issues by their opportunity costs.
33
GUZMAN AND SIMMONS (2005) investigate the question if disputes under the WTO are driven by
power considerations or by capacity constraints and find their empirical results to be consistent with
the capacity hypothesis, namely that potential complainants choose their defendants in accordance
with their resources. According to their results Members are the more attractive as defendants the
higher the prospective market access gains and thereby the lower the opportunity costs of the
disputes, i.e. the larger the defendant’s markets. As market size in their theory is correlated with
political and economic power the power hypothesis, i.e. that complainants are selecting weaker
defendants, is not supported. They model capacity costs C as a function of the resource costs Q
including monitoring and investigation of policy measures, negotiating, filing and litigating a case
and Members’ available resources R, such that C=Q/R and assume Q to be constant across all
disputes.
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Operating experience with the system is likely to decrease direct costs of disputes.
Governmental officials learn by going through the process of working with
lawyers
34
According to DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) this experience shows a strong
effect on Members’ cost structure when using the DSM. They hypothesize that
most developing countries face high startup costs when they use the DSM to
adjudicate their trade issues because of their weak trade policy infrastructure. This
suggests that direct costs may be differentiated with respect to fixed and variable
costs of the process, where fixed costs comprise the expenditures for WTO-
related capacities in terms of building efficient domestic bureaucratic structures,
official procedures and personnel. Once established, those structures provide the
basis for an effective and automatic processing of trade disputes. The costs that
are related to the ‘birth’ of trade issues, e.g. monitoring, gathering information,
identifying violations, dealing with private sector petitions and preparing the
arguments for negotiations are likely to be case-independent and may be absorbed
in the trade agency’s operating budget. Additional expenditures as case-dependent
variable costs may then arise when legal expertise is employed, e.g. by
engagement of international trade law firms.
, information stemming from cases might be of help in the interpretation
of other cases, and an increased attentiveness to trade issues and understanding of
the process among industries might help in the upstream process of gathering and
disclosure of information and the transfer and mediation of the private sector’s
trade interests.
From this differentiated cost perspective developing countries with a
weakly developed trade-policy infrastructure may be dependent on hiring private
counsel for their cases whereas well-endowed Members may rely on their
domestic lawyers. This may be an additional burden for them to engage in cases.
Confirming their argument on the relevance of startup costs and the influence of
experience in this context DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) demonstrate how learning
through prior disputes either as complainant or as defendant increases developing
countries’ probability to initiate disputes.
35
34
DUPONT ET AL. (2006) show in simulation experiments how the negotiation ability of developing
country diplomats is positively influenced through experience.
GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) find empirical
35
Additionally, DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) demonstrate the experience shows diminishing returns,
i.e. that its impact on the initiation probability decreases after several filed cases. For developed
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support for the positive impact of Members’ operating experience on their number
of filed disputes, measured as their membership time.
Additionally, costs are assumed to be dependent on the organizational
effectiveness of administrative structures. Highly integrated and developed trade
administrations having special agencies for WTO adjudication as realized in the
U.S. and the EC are more efficient. Hence, fixed cost-related institutional
capacities generate economies of scale for processing trade issues. As countries’
governmental system is intertwined with their administrative structures and
statutory framework of their domestic political process it might show an influence
on Members’ predisposition and ability to use the WTO dispute settlement
system.
Democratic governance is likely to offer an advantageous starting position
in this respect. First, democratic states might show a higher commitment to
judicial processes of dispute resolution and thereby also to their engagement in
adjudicative practices on the international level, second, may have a better
understanding of adjudication and negotiation processes, and third, might be
better equipped with capable lawyers and administrative personnel (DAVIS AND
BERMEO 2009). This familiarity with democratic governance and judicial
processes may decrease fixed costs of litigation. REINHARDT (2000) examining
this determinant both for the GATT and the beginning of the WTO period
provides empirical evidence that democracies had a higher likelihood to initiate
disputes over the period 1948 to 1998. BUSCH (2000) shows empirically that
highly democratic dyads in the WTO context have a higher probability to achieve
concessions at the consultation stage and DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) in their
study focused on developing countries demonstrate that democracies are more
likely to initiate disputes.
4.2.2. Potential indirect costs of dispute initiation
On the costs side direct litigation and pre-trial costs
D
ijk
C
are complemented by
indirect costs of a dispute. Indirect costs may be associated with filing a
countries experience does not yield any impact and they argue that startup costs are a relatively
minor obstacle for them as they have greater resources to substitute for this. Another explanation for
this may be that they are equipped with a better trade policy infrastructure thereby facing lower
start-up costs.
The drivers of dispute initiation under the World Trade Organization
75
complaint as a consequence of close economic, political or military
interdependencies between the complainant’s and the respondent’s economy that
potentially add to the dynamic of the procedure. There may result economic
damages caused by the dispute, if the defendant seeks for outer-WTO retribution,
e.g. by cutting bilateral economic aid, military defense cooperation or preferential
market access for the complainant granted under the general system of
preferences. The complainant may have to fear a counter-complaint. Additionally,
the political relationship with the respondent may be harmed in general as a
dispute might be interpreted as a hostile and contentious act.
36
In the broader sense all influences that are connected to strategic
considerations and that may take influence on Members’ behavior in negotiating
disputes can be subsumed under the potential indirect costs of disputes. Formally,
those potential indirect costs of a dispute are gathered in term
I
ij
C and are
independent of the affected market (denoted by k ) and dependent on the political
and economic relationship between complainant and respondent, resulting in a
new version of inequality 4.1,
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The literature provides evidence on the relevance of the aforementioned indirect
costs of disputes. There are examples for countersuits and REINHARDT (2000)
provides empirical support for their occurrence.
37
36
BRECKENRIDGE (2005) in his case study on Costa Rica’s challenge of US restrictions on imports
of underwear (WT/DS24) shows how anticipated political costs may influence the initiation
decision. He reports that in the beginning Costa Rican foreign affair officials were hesitant to file a
complaint for fear of damages to the political relationship with the US.
Members’ probability of
initiating a dispute against their trade partner is significantly increased if they
were targeted by that trade partner in the previous year. From this follows that
disputes are also used as a retribution measure or within a tit-for-tat strategy.
GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) demonstrate how Members exert self-constraint in using the
DSM in order to not provoke to be challenged themselves when their trade
policies are more protective. This reveals a strategy not to put certain political
37
GUZMAN and SIMMONS (2005) provides an example for a countersuit: Brazil’s request for
consultation (WT/DS/70 and 71) about Canadian aircraft subsidies followed Canadian’s complaint
against Brazil made 9 months earlier on the same issue (WT/DS/46).
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objectives at risk that are achieved through protectionism and may also be
motivated by political economy drivers discussed further below.
Concerning potential economic losses that might occur as a means of
retribution, BOWN (2004a) argues that small developing countries might not
initiate disputes because they fear of losing bilateral aid and unilateral trade
privileges granted under the generalized system of preferences. BOWN (2005a)
demonstrates a negative impact of Members’ dependency on bilateral aid on their
probability to join disputes as co-complainant or interested third party. BOWN
(2004b) shows that developing countries as defendants were more likely to yield
compliance when they received bilateral economic aid from the complainant
Member.
38
BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) focusing on the matter of success in disputes
suggest that international economic obligations show influence on Members’
chances to win disputes and find empirical evidence that the reliance on bilateral
economic aid significantly decreases their probability of success. This suggests
that developing countries constrain themselves in order not to put their privileges
at risk. Taking recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism is thus a less
favorable option for them as the successful resolution of the concerned trade
issues crucially depends on complainants’ performance in the procedure. In
addition, the results of BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) support that defendants’
military power in terms of the military expenditure gap between complainant and
defendant shows a negative impact on developing countries’ likelihood to win
disputes. According to their interpretation, trade disputes are dependent on the
political relationship and thereby the result of power and conflicts between
countries. The interpretation also includes that political powerful states are able to
‘seize’ legalized procedures like the DSM.
Taking power imbalances and dependencies into account in the bilateral
political relationship between complainant and respondent is based on the
rationale that power is defined by its means, i.e. Members’ resources that allow
them to impose their interests on others. According to IIDA (2002) power
38
This finding is based on descriptive statistics: He shows for a set of 23 developing countries over
the period 1978-1998 that the mean share of aid received from the complaining Member in case of
liberalization is nearly twice the share (9.61%) when no liberalization occurred (5.68%). Of the aid-
receivers 43% complied whereas of the non-aid-receivers only 33% complied.
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considerations are likely to influence the dispute settlement procedures through
bilateral arrangements between the parties to the dispute and also to facilitate
favorable decisions despite of agreement violations. From the viewpoint of
international organization and political science literature, Members’ capacity in
terms of financial, administrative and personnel resources is seen as a means of
power, giving them an advantage in legalized systems (ABBOTT AND SNIDAL,
2000). This runs contrary to the findings of GUZMAN AND SIMMONS (2005) that
power considerations are playing a minor role in the calculations of developing
countries as they focus on the large markets to overcome their capacity
constraints.
However, an issue that is difficult to account for in the empirical analysis
on drivers of the DSM is the high share of cases that are settled ‘out-of-court’, i.e.
before a panel ruling and even before the request for a panel.
39
39
Early settlement and mutually agreed solutions are encouraged by the legal framework of the
DSM. BUSCH and REINHARDT (2000) report that about 80% of all disputes end prior to a panel ruling
and most of them without request for a panel.
The problem
related to this is that the influences behind the largest share of negotiated trade
issues are difficult to account for in empirical analysis. As BUSCH AND
REINHARDT (2003) argue, ‘negotiations are still the driving force behind WTO
dispute settlement, notwithstanding the more legal architecture of the DSU’.
Hence, it is at this stage where unobserved negotiation strategies and bargaining
power come into play that are not accounted for so far in econometric analyses of
initiation behavior. As BUSCH AND REINHARDT (2000) report, most cases settle at
an early stage, and most of the fullest concessions are reached in early settlement.
From a strategic viewpoint, this success of early settlement might depend on the
ability to credibly threaten to proceed through all stages of a dispute. Besides
Members’ ability to threaten retaliation – e.g. through retaliatory tariffs, as
described under the next paragraph referring to uncertainty issues – the
abovementioned power and political cost considerations may influence their
bargaining power in consultations.
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4.2.3.Uncertainty of panel decision and compliance
The outcome of a WTO dispute is uncertain with respect to (1) a favorite ruling of
the panel process and (2) an economic successful outcome, i.e. if compliance is
satisfactory from the complainant’s perspective. A defendant might be unwilling
to bring its trade regime into account with the agreement even after a positive
ruling for the complainant. The rationales for non-compliance are the same as
those for the implementation of protectionism.
40
First, countries can benefit from introducing import duties provided that the
rate of the duties are below a certain critical level and that trade partners do not
retaliate by imposing higher duties on their own (BICKERDIKE 1906 and JOHNSON
1953). Large Members in terms of market size can manipulate the terms-of-trade
to their advantage by imposing import tariffs and JOHNSON (1953) and KENNAN
AND RIEZMAN (1988) demonstrate that countries gain by starting a tariff war if
their market is substantially larger than that of their trade partner even if
retaliation occurs. BOWN (2002) demonstrates with a theoretical model applied to
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism how Members with the capacity to take
advantage of their terms-of-trade gains implement WTO illegal protection when
their trade partners do not have the potential to impose terms-of-trade losses
through retaliation.
Second, drawing on the concept of social welfare maximizing governments
and by applying the findings of BALDWIN (1987) on the correspondence between
the concept of social welfare maximization and political economy drivers in the
context of tariff-setting
41
40
See e.g. BALDWIN (1982) and HILLMAN (1990) for an overview on Political economy approaches
to the implementation of protectionism. BOWN (2002) provides the theoretical grounds why WTO
Members choose to implement WTO inconsistent protection. xxx
, a defendant would maintain the trade barrier if it gives
too much weight to export profits. However, as argued by STIGLER (1971) and
PELTZMAN (1976) governments seldom aim at policies to maximize social
welfare. Their motivators for implementing and maintaining protectionist policies
might more likely stem from the driving forces in the political process as analyzed
41
BALDWIN (1987): Baldwin starts from a social welfare maximizing model referring to it as the
“deus ex machina” process of tariff formation, where a government maximizes weighted consumer
surplus, firms’ profits and tariff revenue. He then compares it with a standard model of political
economy driven tariff formation and analytically shows that both models yield the same
optimization result.
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by BROCK AND MAGEE (1978), FEENSTRA AND BHAGWATI (1982), FINDLAY
AND WELLISZ (1982), MAYER (1984) and GROSSMAN AND HELPMAN (1994 and
1995).
Third, from this political economy perspective the decision about
compliance in response to the retaliation threat is determined by the relative
influence of competing interests in the economy (see GOULD AND WOODBRIDGE
1998). Concerning non-compliance, it might be rational for the defendant to keep
the trade barrier in place if the political support received from its profiting export
sector exceeds the loss of political support from competing free-trade interests.
Finally, the compliance process might involve considerable adjustment costs for
the infringer through the reorganization of the implemented trade regime. Those
costs might differ among Members, markets, political systems and type of policy
measure.
Both aspects of uncertainty can formally be introduced as probabilities, (1)
the probability of a successful ruling and (2) the probability of satisfactory
compliance modifying the first summand in inequality 4.1 to the expected gains
from expanding trade,
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denotes the complainant’s probability to win the dispute, depending
on the complainant’s capacity to effectively make the case and may be also
related on the respondent’s defending capacity, and
( )
C
ij
π ⋅
denotes the probability
of compliance, depending on the complainant’s retaliation capacity with respect
to the defendant’s market.
The probability of a successful ruling is assumed to depend on the
complainant’s endowment with resources that are critical for effectively preparing
and processing negotiations, and the dispute and might also depend on the
defending capacity of the respondent. The required resources on the
complainant’s side may be its endowment with skilled legal personnel and its
administrative capacities. The complexity of WTO law requires legal and
negotiating expertise to identify violations, to work out the arguments and
evidence, to develop a strategy and prepare the submissions during the panel
process.
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Scientific expertise is seen to play a major role in SPS
42
issues (HENSON ET AL.,
1999). ABBOTT AND SNIDAL (2000) emphasize the importance of skilled
personnel to effectively use legalized systems in general and BESSON AND MEHDI
(2004) provide empirical evidence on the positive influence of legal capacity on
dispute outcome at the panel stage. The relevance of capacity constraints on the
side of developing and least developed countries – especially in terms of legal
expertise – is stated by several authors (see e.g. DELICH, 2002, GUZMAN AND
SIMMONS, 2005, and HOEKMAN AND KOSTECKI, 2001). GUZMAN AND SIMMONS
(2005) argue that developing countries’ capacity deficits are even more
constraining with increasing complexity of WTO law and provide empirical
evidence that capacity constraints result in a strategy of targeting the largest
markets. This suggests that they have to carefully select their defendants to
allocate their resources to the highest valued targets as described above under the
section on trade objective and related direct costs.
43
As legal expertise may be hired to make the case, deficient domestic legal
staff can be substituted by domestic financial resources for hiring lawyers.
Concerning this impact of financial resources, BUSCH and REINHARDT (2003)
identify Members’ income as relevant influence on their ability to negotiate early
concessions at the consultation stage under the WTO, however not for their
successful resolution at the panel stage.
Enlarging the perspective to this issue of Members’ negotiation
performance, the probabilities introduced in inequality 4.3 may be also interpreted
as Members’ ability to successfully negotiate their trade issues at the consultation
stage and to bargain concessions ‘in the shadow of the law’. However, variation
in legal capacity – in most studies measured as Members’ delegation size at
Geneva – does not seem to show a major impact on the variation in disputes when
other important factors like complainants’ export diversity, their trade stakes in
42
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations covers government standards to
protect human, animal and plant life and health. It is aimed at ensuring food safety (GOODE 2004).
43
GUZMAN AND SIMMONS (2005): Their study incorporates 352 complainant-defendant pairs with
324 requests for consultations under all agreements over the period 1995-01-01 to 2004-31-12.
Addressing resource constraints they control for GDP, GDP per capita, WTO staff, general
diplomatic resources, domestic financial resources and past participation in WTO disputes and
demonstrate that all measures show a significant impact on the selection on the largest markets in
selecting their defendants.
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the issue, the extent of protectionism in the complainant’s and the defendant’s
market, their governmental system and retaliatory capacity is controlled for (see
e.g. DAVIS AND BERMEO 2009 and GÖTZ ET AL. 2010). Least developed countries
in particular are seen to be disadvantaged with respect to their ability to use the
DSM because they are lacking personnel representation at Geneva, financial
capacities and the required expertise (SOUTH CENTRE 1999). Most LDC Members
do not have special staff allocated to WTO matters but have to split their
personnel resources between different international agreements (HOEKMAN AND
KOSTECKI 2001). MICHALOPOULOS (2001) reports that in the year 2000 70% of
developing country Members of the WTO did not have the minimum of four staff
based in Geneva that is considered necessary for effective representation in WTO
meetings across the different areas of WTO policy. This suggests that Members’
representation at Geneva might show a bottleneck effect on their ability to
effectively engage in their trade interests.
The structure, organization and integration level of Members’ trade
agencies is also likely to influence their capability to process cases under the
WTO. SHAFFER (2003) and SHAFFER ET AL. (2003) describe how the highly
developed and integrated trade agencies of the U.S. and the EC provide the
foundation for an institutionalized linkage between private and public sector. This
integrated framework is an important advantage with respect to gathering case-
relevant information especially at the pre-litigation stage and what is described by
HOEKMAN AND KOSTECKI (2001) as the ‘upstream process’ of WTO disputes.
HOEKMAN AND MAVROIDIS (2000) emphasize developing countries’ weak trade-
policy infrastructures as one impediment to their access to the DSM. DAVIS AND
BERMEO (2009) and GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) argue that Members’ administrative
efficiency may show an impact on their initiation probability, but cannot find a
significant impact.
44
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Both studies use the World Bank’s measure of governmental effectiveness; see e.g. KAUFMANN
(2004). World Bank governance indicators are available online at:
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/, 2011-09-20.
However, HUSSAIN (2005) in his case study on Pakistan
reports how the development of WTO-related administrative structures provides
the foundation for effective participation in WTO dispute settlement which is
described in more detail under the chapter on monitoring issues below.
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In addition to its moderating influence on the direct costs of disputes, operating
experience with the system or with related legalized systems of conflict resolution
may contribute to the administrative DSM-related efficiency and thereby increase
Members’ likelihood of effective litigation. This point is stressed by HOEKMAN
AND MAVROIDIS (2000). DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) focus their empirical
investigation on operating experience and find support for the significant impact
of Members’ experience from dispute participation both as complainants and as
defendants. GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) find evidence on Members’ overall experience
with the system in terms of their membership time. As demonstrated under the
aspect of decreasing fixed costs of litigation through institutional capacity above,
Members’ experience with democratic governance is also likely to show a
positive influence on their ability to successfully adjudicate cases. This
experience is likely to be connected to a better understanding of legalized
negotiation and adjudication processes and more democratic Members might be
better equipped with legal and administrative personnel.
It might be possible that a successful complaint is negatively related to the
defendant’s capacities, i.e. that economically advanced and better endowed
defendants are better equipped with skilled legal personnel and financial resources
so that they can afford the best possible defense and may as a result win the case
that a less equipped Member would lose. However, complainants win the vast
majority of cases that are decided by a panel (HOLMES ET AL. 2003)
45
However, as most disputes do not reach the panel stage, interpreting the
calculated winning probability related to panel decisions as a winning probability
and
according to GUZMAN AND SIMMONS (2005) there is no considerable difference
in panel settling rates between developed and developing countries. Based on this,
GUZMAN AND SIMMONS (2005) are skeptical with respect to the influence of
respondents’ defending ability on the dispute outcome. Although possibly
showing a minor influence, the respondent’s ability to justify its trade policy on
grounds of WTO agreements may be of relevance.
45
HOLMES ET AL. (2003): They report that complainants won disputes 88% of the times where the
dispute was decided by a panel ruling. Their study comprises 276 WTO disputes under all
agreements that occurred over the period from 1995-01-01 to 2002-31-12. Their finding on the rate
of success in disputes is based on a simplified approach. Cases are denoted as won by the
complainant if at least one of the issues raised is scored for him.
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in general might be too much of a simplification. The number of cases that do not
reach the panel stage and thereby are not included in this probability calculation
may lead to a distorted interpretation. They might not reach the panel stage
because complainants are lacking the resources to proceed to the panel phase.
BUSCH AND REINHARDT (2002) state on this issue “Identifying winners is
complicated by the high number of disputes that never reach the DSU, and a high
proportion of those that do, do not result in a panel report”. According to
HOLMES ET AL. (2003) the high proportion of complainant victories may also
suggest that complainants select very carefully their respondents with respect to
their chances of winning the case.
Formally, the probability of a successful ruling may be interpreted as a
function dependent on different characteristics that are related to Members’
economy, governmental traits and endowments,
( )
, , , ,
S
ij i i i i j
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where
i
l
denotes the complainant’s endowment with skilled personnel,
i
η
stands
for the effectiveness of its WTO-related administrative structures,
i
Y
indicates its
domestic financial resources, and
i
e
assigns its operating experience with the
system. The corresponding defendant’s characteristics are gathered in term
j
d
denoting its overall defending capacity and is supposed to show a negative minor
impact.
The probability of compliance may be seen as dependent on the defendant’s
motivators as described above and on the complainant’s ability to enforce
compliance, namely its retaliation capacity. If the defendant does not comply with
the panel or appellate body ruling the complainant may be authorized to impose
penalty tariffs on its imports from the defendant’s market. However, a credible
retaliation threat depends both on the complainant’s as well as on the defendant’s
characteristics.
According to BAGWELL AND STAIGER (2000) and DAM (1970) the threat of
retaliation has been the major component of enforcing compliance under the
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GATT system.
46
BOWN (2002) demonstrates that a country’s capacity to influence its terms -
of-trade determines the credibility of its retaliation threat which is theoretically
confirmed as well by KENNAN AND RIEZMAN (1988).
Although the systemic change in dispute settlement from GATT
to the WTO is often described by economists as the replacement of a ‘power-
based’ by a more ‘rules-based’ system (see e.g. JACKSON 1997 and TREBILCOCK
AND HOWSE 1999), trade retaliation by the complainant remains the central
component for the enforcement of compliance. The success of this power is
linked to countries’ relevance as trade partner. There is theoretical and empirical
support that retaliatory power is not uniformly distributed over Members and that
imbalances relating to trade value and market size influence their ability to
enforce compliance.
47
Concerning developing countries’ success in disputes in terms of a positive
ruling, BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) discover empirical support for the positive
impact of their trade retaliation power. The positive impact of retaliatory capacity
on the probability to join initiated disputes as co-complainant or interested third
party is substantiated by BOWN (2005a), and BOWN (2004c) shows a significant
influence of the threat of retaliation of trade partners on countries’ decision to
abide by their international obligations in agreements. BOWN (2005b)
demonstrates the positive impact of Members’ retaliation capacity on their
likelihood to challenge trade remedies imposed by the U.S..
BOWN (2004b) argues that
small developing countries might anticipate that they will not be able to gain
concessions from larger trade partners. They show that the complainant’s
retaliatory capacity, measured as the share of the defendant’s total exports or as
the real dollar value of exports from the defendant sent to the complainant shows
a significant influence on the successful resolution of the dispute, measured as
increased trade value three years after dispute initiation.
46
DAM (1970) states for the GATT system: “(…) retaliation itself may prove to be a relatively weak
sanction when the injured contracting party is not a major customer for a major product of the
offending contracting party. Many less-developed countries have felt powerless to influence the
restrictive commercial policies of developed countries because they did not consume enough of any
of the latter’s’ exports.”
47
The analysis of BOWN (2002) is based on an economic model with two countries and two traded
goods and demonstrates that a country’s capacity to retaliate is dependent on its ability to affect its
terms-of-trade. The compensation amount is also shown to be positively affected by a country’s
retaliation capacity.
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BUSCH AND REINHARDT (2003) show that poor countries gained less concessions
through WTO adjudication than rich countries and conclude that this is – besides
their limited legal capacity – due to their lack of retaliatory power. HOEKMAN
AND KOSTECKI (2001) and HUDEC (2002) state that developing countries
challenging industrial countries might face the problem that they cannot credibly
threaten retaliatory measures. Imposing retaliatory tariffs is likely to be more
costly to them in welfare terms than it is punishing the industrial defendant and
raising import barriers of a small market has little impact on the large target
market.
There might also be the impediment for retaliation that complainants
cannot afford to cut imports from the defendant because they are dependent on
them for their industry or consumption.
48
First, the complainant’s capacity to retaliate is directly related to the total
amount or the share of the defendant’s exports going to the complainant’s market.
This determinant is likely to be positively related to the complainant’s market
size. Second, the defendant’s potential to deflect trade losses imposed through
retaliatory measures to third country markets may show an influence. BOWN
(2005a) argues that countries might face a market-specific fixed cost of exporting
that lowers their ability to easily deflect trade to new markets. Additionally,
countries that are less diversified in their exports are likely to be harmed by
retaliation measures more than countries that have a more diversified export
structure with respect to trade partners. The opportunities to deflect trade may
vary other Members which is demonstrated by BOWN AND CROWLEY (2007).
Both aspects, the defendant’s share of exports sent to the complainant’s market
and its ability to deflect trade losses can be described as the defendant’s export
dependency from the complainant. Third, the complainant’s dependency from
BESSON AND MEHDI (2004) empirically
demonstrate that developing country complainants’ performance in disputes is
negatively influenced by their dependency on imports from the respondent. From
this follows that Members’ trade retaliatory capacity is determined by several
factors.
48
In the Bananas case Ecuador was for the first time in WTO adjudication entitled to cross
retaliation because it was not able to retaliate against the EU in the sector of merchandise imports
and the panel concluded that retaliation against imports of intermediates and machinery would be
ineffective – that is, too costly for the economy (see e.g. HOEKMAN ANDKOSTECKI (2001), p.83).
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imports coming from the defendant’s market – related to its industry as well as for
domestic consumption – may be negatively related to its trade retaliation capacity.
Both the defendant’s export and the complainant’s import dependency might be
positively related to the degree of conformity of the trade partners’ market and
trade structures. Finally, the complainant’s opportunities to purchase relevant
imports from third country markets may show a negative impact on its import
dependency from the defendant and thereby a positive effect on its retaliatory
ability.
Hence, the complainant’s minor relevance as trade partner to the defendant
and the complainant economy’s dependency on imports of intermediates, intra-
industry trade, or consumer goods from the defendant’s market are the grounds
for unlikely or ineffective trade retaliation.
49
Members’ governmental system might show an influence on their success
in bilateral negotiations as their experience with democratic processes on the
domestic level may also be transferred to the international level. As quoted under
the article of direct litigation costs above BUSCH (2000) shows empirically that
highly democratic dyads in the WTO context are more likely to achieve
concessions at the consultation stage than non-democratic dyads.
As a consequence of the
complainant’s inability of enforcement, the defendant is in the position to exploit
the maximum potential gains from the WTO-inconsistent policies as theoretically
demonstrated by BICKERDIKE (1906), JOHNSON (1953) and KENNAN AND
RIEZMAN (1988).
In addition to Members’ trade retaliation capacity they may threaten to
withdraw bilateral economic aid or preferential trade access from an economically
dependent respondent in order to enforce concessions. This is just the mirror
image of the empirically supported indirect cost issue described under the section
on potential indirect costs of dispute initiation. The probability of a successful
compliance can formally be interpreted as a function of the complainant’s trade
49
The withdrawal of concessions under the TRIPS agreement might be an alternative for some
developing countries when their markets are too small to impose a significant retaliation threat. This
means has been considered by Ecuador in its dispute against the EC: On 8 November 1999, Ecuador
requested authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the EC of concessions or other
related obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, GATS and GATT 1994, pursuant to Article 22.2 of
the DSU, in an amount of US$450 million. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, online available under
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/stplay_e.doc, 2011-04-01.
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and economic retaliation capacity, dependent on the complainant’s and
respondent’s characteristics as described above,
( )
,
C X E
ij ij ij
f R Rπ =
, (3.5)
where
X
ij
R
is the trade related retaliatory capacity of complainant
i
with respect to
defendant
j
’s market and
E
ij
R
denotes economic and other outer-WTO related
redistribution opportunities of complainant
i
with respect to the economy of
respondent
j
.
4.3 Monitoring issues, upstream process, and political
economy drivers
This chapter complements the cost benefit analysis for the decision of filing a
dispute by the discussion of (1) official monitoring issues which are partly related
to the cost benefit aspects as discussed above, (2) the upstream process during the
pre-litigation phase, i.e. identification of WTO violations, collective action and
petitioning issues on the private sector level and (3) political economy drivers
which are likely to play a role for the selection of trade issues on the
governmental level.
Identification of infringements is the precondition for adjudicating trade
issues under the DSM. Information and its transmission to the government are
critical factors of this process that is characterized by HOEKMAN ANDMAVROIDIS
(2000) as the upstream process of the multilateral enforcement mechanism.
Information may stem from two different sources: official monitoring of trade
policies abroad and the domestic private sector.
First, governments may have developed official institutions to gather
information on potential WTO infringements of their trade partners that
negatively affect domestic export- or import-competing firms, e.g. national
agencies maintaining monitoring functions like trade agencies and also embassies
abroad. The Trade Barriers Report of the U.S. is an example for an official
instrument dedicated to gather, exploit and provide trade-policy related
information. Countries’ capability to create such official structures largely
depends on their resources. Members with limited capacities are unlikely to invest
much in monitoring trade policies abroad and to investigate alleged violations by
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trade partners. Less detection of infringements is then a probable result of lower
monitoring activity. GUZMAN AND SIMMONS (2005) argue that “especially at the
monitoring stage, countries with more extensive official economic contacts will
be in a better position to assess trade policies that run counter to WTO rules and
national interests”. They show how developing Members’ ability to field skilled
official diplomatic and economic personnel to gather information on trade
partners’ policies is positively related to the variation of disputes against
developed Members.
50
The establishment of WTO relevant institutional capacity for monitoring is
likely to be promoted by Members’ experience with and their commitment to the
system. DAVIS AND BERMEO (2009) substantiate the importance of experience for
the participation in the DSM and argue that it promotes learning by doing and
decreases start-up costs for subsequent disputes. HUSSAIN (2005) in his case study
on Pakistan provides an example for the influence of experience on the
organization of WTO-related trade infrastructure. Pakistan’s experience with its
first filed case as sole complainant resulted in the establishment of an effective
institutional framework both at the domestic level and in Geneva to deal with
WTO matters. Pakistan challenged a U.S. safeguard measure on combed cotton
yarn in 2000.
51
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In their model Members’ overall diplomatic force is measured as their number of embassies
abroad.
According to HUSSAIN (2005), at the time of Pakistan’s request
for bilateral consultations on April 3, 2000, “there was no effective institutional
framework within the Ministry of Commerce which could deal with WTO-related
dispute settlement cases’’. During the process of the dispute Pakistan built up a
WTO cell at the permanent mission office in Geneva, a section in its Ministry of
Commerce dedicated to WTO issues, and a WTO Council chaired by the Minister
of commerce. The WTO cell has three major functions: Besides (1)
communication of the WTO system’s rules to the relevant authorities in Pakistan,
it (2) shall supply guidelines on trade- and dispute settlement-related issues to
affected domestic firms, and (3) maintain an archive of and conduct research on
past cases and rulings in order to support the private and the public sector to
develop the right strategy for future cases (HUSSAIN 2005). Hussain also states
that one major conclusion from the dispute was that the government should play a
51
Dispute settlement case 192 (see WTO 2010).
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more proactive role in future trade issues. Hence, the commitment to the
enforcement mechanism of the multilateral trading system is related to Members’
experience with the system itself as a means to successfully defend their trade
interests.
In general, countries’ deeper integration into world trade is likely to
stimulate commitment and required investments to increase their participation in
the system. Integration into international trade, commitment to the principles of
the multilateral trading system and legalized procedures of conflict resolution, and
the development of required institutional capacities all go hand in hand.
The second source of information is the private sector. Private firms facing
obstacles in their exports to foreign markets or import-competing firms whose
prospects are impaired through market-distorting foreign subsidies have several
options: they can petition the foreign government to abandon their trade-distorting
policies; they may take recourse to ways of private arbitration or adjudication in
the foreign economy; they can petition their own government to pursue the case
under the DSM, or they can drop the issue. Petitioning their own government to
take up the issue with the foreign government may not be an attractive option for
private firms as this involves costs of gathering information and identifying the
violation, preparing arguments with assistance of attorneys and contacting and
lobbying governmental officials. Additionally, the success of lobbying activities
and the final outcome of a WTO dispute are uncertain. This suggests a cost-
benefit analysis quite similar to the governmental economic initiation condition
described above. Private actors have to assess if the anticipated benefits justify the
allocation of their resources to lobbying activities.
A collective action problem may arise as enough private actors have to be
mobilized to increase the success of lobbying. A likely outcome is that only major
cases in terms of trade stakes are brought forward for petitioning (HOEKMAN AND
KOSTECKI 2001). For the example of the U.S. this is reflected in the large
difference between the quantity of identified violations in the official Trade
Barriers Report and the relative small number of U.S. trade disputes that are
pursued under the Section 301 and have been brought forward by private sector
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interests, as reported by SEVILLA (1998).
52
The effectiveness of the upstream process in Members’ economies is
dependent both on characteristics of their trade sector as well as on their
institutional capacity. First, Members’ domestic business community may not
consider WTO adjudication as a solution to their problem as suspected by DAVIS
AND BERMEO (2009) for the case of developing countries. As a consequence,
there would be no transfer of information on infringements to the responsible
administrative agencies. Second, even if the business community is aware of and
attentive to WTO relevant issues in its export relations, the domestic industrial
structure may influence the cost-benefit assessment and its ability to mobilize
private interests and political pressure. The export sector of developing countries
is typically characterized by small and medium size enterprises thereby limiting
their available resources for lobbying activities. This also implicates a lower
concentration of their industrial structures which makes it more difficult to
organize interests, as emphasized by political economy models and causes their
affected industries more likely to suffer from the free-rider problem. Third, the
effectiveness of the domestic infrastructure for information transfer from the
private to the public sector may vary over Members.
As only governments have legal
standing at the WTO, they act as filters in respect of selecting and pursuing the
cases that they assess as being relevant according to their policy objectives
(HOEKMAN ANDMAVROIDIS 2000). However, governments may only take action
on the set of violations that they are cognizant of. An under-provision of
information may result in an inefficient outcome both for individual firms and for
the multilateral system as a whole (HOEKMAN ANDKOSTECKI 2001).
The U.S. with its Section 301 and the EC by its Trade Directorate-General
of the European Commission have established integrated devices to gather
information from private firms and to facilitate coordination between the public
and the private sector. The U.S. and the EU also stand out concerning the
international network established to gather information on trade issues. Those
mechanisms ensure that information stemming from the private sector is
efficiently exploited to get aware of potential WTO issues as well as to support
52
By Section 301 of Trade Act 1974 firms, associations, or interested persons may petition the U.S.
Trade Representative to investigate trade infringements by foreign countries that negatively affect
U.S. exports.
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negotiations and litigation of U.S. and European trade claims (see SHAFFER
2003). SHAFFER (2003) further shows that WTO litigation in the U.S. and the EU
is heavily influenced by private interests lobbying the government to represent
their case through adjudication. GÖTZ AND HECKELEI (2011) focusing on the
agro-food sector find empirical support for the impact of the national environment
for organizing lobbying activities and their influencing power on the domestic
political decision process.
The diminishing influence of experience on fixed costs in the upstream
process of disputes may as well apply to the industry. Industries may develop
efficient structures to gather information, to organize and to use channels to
inform and petition their government. Additionally, information about one case is
likely to increase awareness in the business community and to generate demand
for additional cases thereby initiating the required investments into the
establishment of structures and procedures for gathering information, cooperation
among firms and channels to communicate their interests with governmental
officials. HUSSAIN (2005) reports that the affected domestic industry (All Pakistan
Textile Mills Association) has formed a WTO committee in the course of
Pakistan’s dispute against the U.S.. Its main purposes are to coordinate with
Pakistan’s Ministry of Commerce for an efficient processing of disputes and to
advise the affected firms on relevant trade issues and WTO law. According to
HUSSAIN (2005) the effective settlement by means of the DSM strengthened the
confidence of the domestic firms in the multilateral trading system.
As argued by SEVILLA (1997), the selection of complaints for litigation is
subject to a complex political process of demand by private producers and supply
by governments. This political economy approach offers additional explanations
for governments’ decision to file disputes. From this perspective, governments act
in response to political pressure and try to maximize political support offered by
different sources in their decision to litigate a case or not. The preferences of
domestic lobbies for policies come from the expected effect on their economic
return and their lobbying effort is related to their anticipated benefit.
In the context of DSM, the potential sources of interest groups are
competitive export- and import-competing firms benefitting from adjudication of
their trade issues under the DSM. Competitive exporting firms, or industries with
relatively abundant factors, benefit from removing trade barriers or reducing
subsidies in the defendant’s market. They thereby expand their opportunities
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through their increased market access and their increased competition both in the
defendant’s as well as in third country markets. Import-competing firms or
industries with relatively scarce factors, benefit from removing trade barriers or
reducing subsidies in the defendant’s market, thereby attenuating the politically
distorted competitive advantage of firms in the defendant’s market. Even if the
defendant failed with compliance, import-competing firms could still benefit from
the complainant’s retaliation measures. Hence, their lobbying activity is supposed
to be positively related to initiating disputes for the removal of trade barriers and
competition-distorting subsidies of trade partners.
Since protectionism may be influenced by private sector interests, which in
particular applies to the agro-food sector, a third influence from the political
economy perspective may play a role. Less-competitive firms benefitting from
protectionism may exert their influence on governments’ decision in the opposite
direction. As shown by REINHARDT (2000), countersuits do play a role under
the DSM providing empirical evidence on this potential threat. The finding of
GÖTZ ET AL. (2010) on the negative influence of Members’ protectionist
tendency on their likelihood of dispute initiation can as well be rationalized based
on this theoretical approach, specifically that protected private sector interests
exert their influence on governments to abstain from a complaint. A forth and
negatively related influence may come from exporting firms that benefit from
preferential market access. Their support for the government may be jeopardized
by ‘risky’ disputes against trade partners that the economy is dependent on.
In the WTO context of dispute settlement the view of governments as
welfare maximizing agents acting in accordance with a cost benefit consideration
and the political economy interpretation on the formation of trade policy are
complementary approaches. On the one hand, the demand for complaints by the
private sector and their supply by governments suggest the political economy
view. On the other hand, the capacity related and political cost-benefit analysis
demonstrates the perspective of governments as welfare maximizing agents who
act in view of various objectives, encompassing responsiveness to the welfare of
the society and political obligations in the international context. This is on the
same line like the interpretation by HOEKMAN AND MAVROIDIS (2000) of
governments acting as filters by selecting trade issues for adjudication both from
the private sector sample and their own agenda depending on diverse national
objectives and constraints.
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Table 4.1: Survey on investigation period, dispute coverage, main issue, used model and incorporated determinants
Empirical study Investigation period and dispute
coverage
Main issue of analysis Used model Incorporated determinants
Besson and Mehdi
(2004)
WTO disputes; 1995-2002; 40
complaints of developing against
developed countries; all agreements
Determinants for a successful
ruling; Developing against
developed countries
Probit model Retaliatory capacity, Legal capacity, Economic
dependency, Capacity to absorb litigation costs,
Dispute duration, Political power
Bown (2004a) GATT & WTO disputes; 64
complaints of defeloping countries
against developing and developed
countries; all agreements
Determinants for compliance;
Focus on developing countries
(1) Multivariate linear
regression
(2) Probit model
Retaliatory capacity, Received bilateral
economic aid, Guilty determination by panel²,
Type of protective policy measure (tariff or NTM)
Bown (2004b) GATT & WTO disputes; 1973-1998;
174 complaints; all agreements
Determinants for compliance Multivariate linear
regression
Retaliatory capacity, Cost of international
obligation for defendant: Guilty determination by
panel² and Small Plaintiff
1
, Involvment of
Appellate Body
0
, Contested policy measure
0
,
Disputed sector
0
Bown (2005a) GATT & WTO disputes; 1992-2003;
complaints against U.S. trade
remedies
Determinants for the initiation of
complaints against U.S. trade
remedies
Probit model Size of market access benefits, Capacity to
absorb litigation costs, Legal capacity, Export
dependency from U.S. market, Size of U.S. trade
remedy², Trade retaliatory capacity
Bown (2005b) WTO disputes; 1995-2000; 54
complaints; complaints against
import protection on MFN-basis
Engagement as Co-Complainant
or Interested third party in initiated
disputes; Focus on developing
countries
Ordered multinomial logit
model
Market access value³, Export dependency from
defendant³, Trade retalation capacity³, Bilateral
aid retaliation capacity³, Capacity to absorb legal
costs, Legal capacity, Bilateral aid dependency
from defendant³, Preferential trade agreement
with defendant³
Davis and Bermeo
(2009)
WTO disputes; 1995-2002; 102
disputes; all agreements; 72
developing countries, 510
observations
Determinants for the initiation of
complaints
Negative binomial model Operational experience, Membership in ACWL,
Democracy, Market size, Wealth, Governmental
effectiveness, Number of high-valued exports,
Share of exports to high-income countries, Share
of agriculture in total exports, Concentration of
trade, Government effectiveness
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Götz et al. (2010) WTO disputes of the agro-food
sector; 1995-2006; 131 disputes of
agro-food sector; 9 agreements; 53
Members in sample
Determinants for the initiation of
complaints
Binomial dispute
distribution model
Export diversity*, Induced costs of litigation,
Endured protectionism by trade partner, Own
protectionist behaviour, Relevance of the
agricultural sector, Importance of the agro-food
export sector, Capacity to absorb legal costs,
Legal capacity, Influence of private actors,
Governmental efficiency, Membership time
Götz and Heckelei
(2011)
WTO disputes of the agro-food
sector; 1995-2005; 91 disputes of
agro-food sector; 9 agreements; 53
Members in sample
Determinants for the initiation of
complaints
Logit model Endured protectionism, Imposed protectionism,
Legal capacity, Capacity to absord legal costs,
Influence of private actors, Importance of agro-
food export sector, Operating experience, Total
import value from defendant³, Export
dependency from defendant³, Import
dependency from defendant³
Guzman and
Simmons (2005)
WTO disputes; 1995-2004; 324
requests for consultation; all
agreements; 352 complainant-
defendant pairings
Determinants for the selection of
defendants
Ordinary least squares
regression with robust
standard errors
Market size, Wealth, Legal capacity, Number of
embassies, Non-military expenditures,
Bureaucratic quality, Operating experience,
Retaliation capacity, Export dependency from
defendant, Countersuit², Preferential trade
agreement with defendant, Co-complainants,
Bandwagon
Holmes et al.
(2003)
WTO disputes; 1995-2002; 279
complaints; all agreements
Involvement and success in
disputes; Impact of type of policy
measure
Descriptive statistics No indicators included - the analysis is
completely based on the evaluation of the
relationship between trade volume and the
occurence of disputes, their ratio of success
linked to types of countries and type of trade
issue
Horn et al. (1999) WTO disputes; 1995-1998; 155
complaints; all agreements
Determinants for the initiation of
complaints
Binomial dispute
distribution model
Export diversity*, Legal capacity
Reinhard (2000) GATT & WTO disputes; 1948-1998;
604 disputes; all agreements;
332728 potential complainant-
defendant combinations over
investigation period
Determinants for the initiation of
complaints
(1) Probit generalized
estimating equation with
first-order autocorrelation
(2) Auxiliary ordered probit
model of dispute outcomes
Democracy, Joint democracy, Countersuit,
Bandwagon, Alliance, Militarized dyadic dispute,
LDC status, Market size, Dyadic trade
dependence, Trade surplus, Preferential trade
agreement, Past concessions
* No control variable but intrinsic component of the used probabilistic model. 0: Indicator on type of trade issue or on trait of the process. 2: Unilateral
indicator on defendant characteristic in estimation. 3: Bilateral indicator dependent on complainant-defendant-relationship. All indicators without superscript
denote unilateral characteristics of the complainant. Source: Own compilation.
9
5
Table 4.2: Survey on findings from empirical studies
Influence on the likelihood to
Scope Determinant Empirical study Initiate
disputes
Partake in
initiated
disputes
Win a
dispute
Reach
compliance
after ruling
Be
targeted as
respondent
Trade objective
and related
direct costs
Export diversity
Horn et al. (1999) +
Götz et al. (2010) +
Export volume
Holmes et al. (2003) + +
Dependence on foreign trade and
trade openness
Reinhardt (2000) + +
Bown (2005b) +
Size of affected exports
Bown (2005a) +
Size of imposed trade remedy
Bown (2005a) +
Export dependency on defendant's
market
Bown (2005a) +
Götz and Heckelei (2011) +
Market size (in terms of GDP)
Bown (2005b) +
Davis and Bermeo (2009) +
Indirect political
costs of disputes
Political economy relationship with
respondent
Bown (2005b) +
Besson and Mehdi (2004) -
Reliance on bilateral assistance
Besson and Mehdi (2004) -
Bown (2005b) -
Military power
Bown (2004b) +
Besson and Mehdi (2004) +
Previous complaint against trade
partner
Guzman and Simmons (2005) +
9
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Uncertainty of
dispute outcome
and compliance
Legal capacity
Horn et al. (1999) +/0
Besson and Mehdi (2004) +
Operational experience with the
system
Davis and Bermeo (2009) +
Götz et al. (2010) +
Götz and Heckelei (2011) +
Trade retaliatory power
Bown (2004b) +
Bown (2005a) + +
Bown (2005b) +
Besson and Mehdi (2004) +
Götz and Heckelei (2011) +
Monitoring
issues, upstream
process and
political economy
drivers
Experience with democratic
governance
Busch (2000) +
Davis and Bermeo (2009) +
Reinhardt (2000) +
Administrative/Governmental
efficiency
Davis and Bermeo (2009) 0
Götz et al. (2010) 0
Götz and Heckelei (2011) 0
Influence of private actors
Götz et al. (2010) 0
Götz and Heckelei (2011) +
For the sake of clarity empirical studies without significant influence are only reported to supplement positive or negative evidence of other studies or when they
stem from the only empirical investigation taking into account the respective determinant.
To get an exhaustive overview and condensed information on studies and their incorporated determinants please compare with table 1.
+: Determinant is substantiated with positive influence on the probability linked to the issue given in the column heading. -: Determinant is substantiated with
negative influence on the probability linked to the issue given in the column heading. 0: No significant influence supported by empirical study.
Source: Own compilation.
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4.4 Conclusions
This chapter is a first attempt to subsume the findings of empirical papers up to
date in a comprehensive framework to consider for the different economic
incentives of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
The first part was along the line of a cost benefit analysis for the initiation of
disputes under the system and structured with respect to (1) complainant’s trade
objective and related direct costs, (2) the potential indirect costs of dispute
initiation that might occur due to political and economic linkages with trade
partners, and (3) the problem of uncertainty of a successful resolution of the issue.
The discussion of influencing factors in the context of this cost-benefit
consideration was complemented by official monitoring issues, the informational
problems that Members may face during the upstream process of disputes and a
condensed description of the political economy process behind governments’
selection of trade issues for adjudication.
The findings from the literature reveal that certain elements of the entire
procedure starting from monitoring via litigation through to enforcement are
critical with respect to Members’ accessibility to the system. At the pre-litigation
stage, Members’ domestic institutional capital is relevant as it provides the basis
for collecting information on infringements both through official monitoring as
well as by exploiting information from the private sector. This endowment with
effective official structures is also important for communication and co-ordination
with affected private firms and offering channels for their petitions. The effective
cooperation between official and private sector is described by SHAFFER (2003) as
‘public-private partnership’ and its relevance is demonstrated both theoretically
and empirically. Additionally, Members’ domestic environment for the
effectiveness of lobbying activity is positively related to their use of the DSM.
The average firm size and concentration of their export sector is likely to show an
impact in this context, as WTO disputes have public good characteristics, and
lobbying activity requires coordination between industries and is costly. This may
involve a collective action problem that is especially relevant for Members with
lower concentration in their export sector.
At the litigation stage, Members’ administrative and litigation power is
important. The first feature is linked to their mentioned domestic institutional
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capacity for gathering and exploitation of information coming from the private
sector or centralized surveillance institutions, and second, to their allocated
resources at Geneva. As shown by the importance of operating experience for the
development of effective DSM-relevant official structures and skilled personnel,
the system may involve high startup costs for developing country Members.
Besides their scarce financial capacities to substitute lacking legal capacity,
deficient trade-related administrative power and also expertise with adjudicative
processes in their domestic environment may be an impediment for them to enter
the system. As empirically demonstrated, their focus on large markets is likely to
account for their high opportunity costs of litigation and reveals a strategy to
overcome capacity constraints.
At the enforcement stage, the relevance of Members’ retaliation capacity is
theoretically underpinned and empirically substantiated. Retaliation power is both
linked to complainants’ relevance as trade partner and to their dependency on
imports from the defendant Member. Strategic considerations as discussed under
the chapter of potential indirect costs play a role in WTO disputes. The fear of a
countersuit, of loosing bilateral economic aid or preferential trade access may
cause governments to refrain from a complaint.
Policy implications of the findings are both related to the multilateral as
well as to the domestic level. In view of the complexity of negotiated issues and
variety of proposals, the drawn conclusions are limited to the most critical factors
and are focused on general principles. The findings demonstrate the importance of
institutional capacity both at the WTO and the domestic level and effective
enforcement of compliance and related constraints especially for smaller
Members. Several proposals in this context are discussed in the ongoing reform
negotiations or have been brought forward by political bodies or economists.
Regarding capacity constraints, changes aiming at more financial and
technical assistance might be of help for affected Members. Two proposals that
are negotiated are to award monetary compensation for litigation costs of
developing country complainants when they prevail in disputes, and, having a
broader scope, to set up a dispute settlement fund for developing countries in
order to provide them with financial means during the course of disputes. The
definition of the beneficiaries, operational details and the relationship with
existing solutions, i.e. technical assistance, dispute settlement assistance by the
WTO Secretariat and by the ACWL are still not clarified.
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NORDSTRÖM (2005) discusses three options of addressing capacity constraints by
alternative ways of settlement available under the current DSU. First, solving
issues in a cooperative way through good offices, conciliation and mediation
offered by the WTO Secretariat and the Director General (Article 5 of DSU).
Second, Article 25 of the DSU provides for arbitration at the will of the parties,
which may be a faster and less costly option than the normal panel process. A
third option that is available to developing countries are the accelerated
procedures with assistance of the Director General. However, NORDSTRÖM 2005
reports that except for one case where mediation has been requested, those
alternative options have not been used at all under the WTO. They require that
both sides concur with those alternative solutions, and this is not the normal
situation. Accelerated procedures may even involve additional difficulties for
capacity constrained Members as the time frames for providing required
evidences are tighter.
Another proposal discussed by NORDSTRÖM 2005 aims at a simplified
dispute settlement procedure for developing country Members. It is intended to
serve as a device for the adjudication of small claims, i.e. issues about small trade
stakes with less procedural requirements and legalized complexity. However, the
practicability of such a reduced procedure depends on the legal proficiency of
panelists. Lowering the demand for legal evidence from the parties to the dispute
implies that the panelists know the law and that the factual account of the trade
issue’s circumstances is sufficient for their ruling on the case (NORDSTRÖM
2005). Hence, this issue is related to negotiations on the requirements for the
composition of panels. Also, it remains to be defined what is considered as a
small claim, if the rulings have precedential value, are appealable and how they
are to be enforced.
The findings on the influence of experience, which are related to
investments in institutional capacity and the development of dedicated official
structures, support the idea of establishing a joint service for legal expertise as
proposed in the report of the SOUTH CENTRE (1999). The idea of this ‘South
network’ is based on the principle of cooperation between developing countries in
order to share information and provide legal expertise at minimal cost. This may
be facilitated by the regular exchange of information and experience between its
members, by regular group consultations and reviews of the functioning of the
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DSM. It may be worth to consider extending the scope of developing country
cooperation by an institutionalized cooperation between them.
Countries facing capacity constraints could bundle their personnel and
administrative resources to save costs. A monitoring and administrative assistance
body could serve its members by monitoring their trade agreements, gathering
information from the private sector, providing channels for the communication of
the private sector’s interests and supplying governments with relevant information
on trade issues in the course of disputes. Further on, it could foster coordination
of developing countries’ engagement in common trade issues to pool their
negotiation and retaliation power. Such coordination could help to overcome the
free-rider problem that has been identified by (BOWN 2005a). Also, it could
promote transparency on trade issues in order to mitigate the threat of outer-WTO
retribution, i.e. decrease the likelihood of indirect costs of disputes. By the
provision of such functions, it could complement the legal assistance provided by
the ACWL and the technical assistance offered in terms of the WTO’s capacity
building initiative.
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An objection to this may be that Members would have to coordinate
surveillance efforts to increase transparency in their trade regimes, which might
raise issues on WTO inconsistent policies between them. However, increased
transparency is, first, consistent with the major objectives of the WTO technical
assistance and, second; Members’ commitment to the WTO principles is the
precondition to their effective participation in the multilateral trading system.
Hence, efforts to decrease foreign barriers to trade should be accompanied by the
willingness to liberalizing domestic trade policies. In addition, as shown by a
number of disputes of developing against developed Members
54
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The capacity-building programme refers to technical support for developing countries to improve
their ability to implement and observe their WTO related treaty obligations (GOODE 2004). The
support is aimed at building up human and institutional capacity and also trade related infrastructure
that are the precondition to effective engagement in various WTO matters and negotiations and also
for reaping the benefits from the trade agreements.
and the findings
of GUZMAN AND SIMMONS (2005) on the tendency to select larger markets by
developing country complainants, Members facing capacity constraints are likely
to share common interests concerning their export interests.
See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/build_tr_capa_e.htm, 2011-10-10.
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A prominent example for a coordinated effort of developing countries is the Bananas case.
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BOWN AND HOEKMAN (2005) suggest encouraging the private sector to provide
legal assistance to developing countries, both at the domestic and the international
level. They investigate how different players of the private sector could offer their
support that capacity constrained Members need at critical stages in the course of
disputes, specifically legal service centers, non-governmental, development and
consumer organizations, economists, and law schools. Such private sector
involvement could also be pooled under the framework of cooperative bodies
described above and be facilitated at the WTO level.
Concerning strengthening the enforcement opportunities, cross-retaliation
could be made available for developing country Members without the general
requirement to justify why same-sector or same-agreement retaliation is not
practicable or effective. A more contentious proposal brought by the Member
Mexico
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HOEKMAN AND MAVROIDIS (2000) propose to encourage the use of the
WTO provisions for renegotiating concessions instead of retaliation. Retaliation
involves raising barriers to trade by the complainant and is likely to show a
negative impact on its own welfare. In contrast to that, the net-impact of
renegotiation could lead towards more liberal trade as it involves compensation of
negatively affected Members by reducing other trade barriers. However,
renegotiation of concession may impose an additional burden on the complainant,
and provide opportunities for the defendant to evade compliance in sectors that
are important to the complainant party.
is to auction off retaliation rights among WTO Members. For a detailed
discussion and analysis of its implications see BAGWELL ET AL. (2003 and 2006).
The problem is that such a mechanism might run counter to the WTO’s general
objectives of liberalizing trade because it implies that Members impose
protectionist policies against other Members without having unresolved trade
issues with them. It is also likely to imply additional political costs that may
outweigh the benefits from enforcement. On the other hand, it may provide an
option to make enforcement of the DSM more effective by multilateralizing the
procedure (BAGWELL ET AL. 2003).
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See document TN/DS/W/23 on the special session of the Dispute Settlement Body (2002-11-02).
Available online at: http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/com/doha/tn/tn_ds_w_023.pdf, 2011-10-13.
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A further proposal subject to negotiations and aiming at mitigating the problem of
retaliation is to introduce monetary compensation. The amount of nullification or
impairment determined for retaliation measures could be awarded as monetary
compensation to developing country complainants. This may involve the problem
that some defendants might use this as an opportunity to buy themselves out of
their commitments. To account for this, it would require further provisions in
terms of increasing compensation after a defined period of non-compliance.
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